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Downing, and Paul Whitaker for English editing as well as to Pavla Vozárová and Martin
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The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on how product complementarity affects
the variety of possible equilibrium outcomes in a vertically differentiated market.
Complementarity is not uncommon. Many vertically differentiated goods have value for
the consumer as complements, that is only if they are used in combination with other
goods which can also be of different qualities (e.g. piano with tuning service, business
trip with hotel accommodation, computing platform with web browsing application, etc.).
Complementarity between goods brings an exogenous expense that the consumer must
pay on top of the price of any of the goods available in a vertically differentiated market.
However, firms are only partially able to compensate consumers for the exogenous
expense by charging lower prices. Some might also be prompted to increase the qualities
of their goods. Then, however, the general validity of the maximum-differentiation
choice cannot be taken for granted as in the classical no-complementarity case. How
many firms will have positive market shares and whether they will serve all consumers
at equilibrium cannot be decided based only on the distribution of the consumer
identification characteristic (income or taste). By taking this into account, this thesis
reveals a set of possible equilibrium outcomes that have been (with few exceptions)
mostly omitted in the existing literature.
In the first essay, exogenous expense is modeled as a lump-sum tax imposed on
consumer incomes. The aim is to show that the maximum-differentiation principle does
not need to be an optimal quality-choice strategy at any size of the exogenous expense.
The larger the tax, the lower the ability (income) or willingness (taste-driven valuation)
of consumers to pay for a given level of quality. Accordingly, there is a critical size
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of exogenous expense, above which the entrant with smaller quality choice is forced to
increase the quality of its good, in order to keep consumers interested in buying. Hence, its
good should not be maximally differentiated from the higher-quality good at equilibrium.
In the second essay, a multi-market setting is introduced in which two complementary
types of goods are sold independently by single-product firms but consumed in a fixed
one-to-one ratio. That is, any two goods of a different type form a pairwise combination.
As a result, the good of each actual entrant could be present in more than one combination.
In this new setting it is shown that the well-known maximum-differentiation principle
could take a new form. Specifically, firms prefer to choose prices at which the so called
”mixed-quality combinations”, consisting of one high-quality good and one low-quality
good each, remain unsold.
In the third essay, again a dual-market setting is analyzed, but one of the firms
is assumed to be a potential entrant in both markets. It could face competition
from a potential superior-quality entrant in one of the markets, and from a potential
inferior-quality entrant in the other market. The aim is to check if, at equilibrium, the
multi-market entrant could effectively deter entry in either of the two markets by selling
its goods only together in a bundle. The results imply that, on the one hand, the entry
of the superior-quality entrant should never be excluded, as long as it could enhance the
quality of the multi-product firm’s bundle, because both firms would then gain. On the
other hand, the entry of the inferior-quality entrant can be deterred via bundling. However,
the entry-deterrence outcome at equilibrium appears to depend in the first place on the
variability of consumer tastes and the quality differentiation of the available combinations,





Cı́lem této práce je objasnit, jak komplementarita statků ovlivňuje rovnováhu
na vertikálně diferencovaných trzı́ch. Komplementarita nenı́ neobvyklá. Mnohé
diferencované statky představujı́ z hlediska spotřebitele komplementy, to znamená, že
jsou užı́vány pouze v kombinaci s jinými statky, které také mohou mı́t různou kvalitu
(např. klavı́r a služby ladiče, pracovnı́ cesta a ubytovánı́, počı́tač a internetový prohlı́žeč
apod.).
Komplementarita mezi statky představuje exogennı́ náklad pro spotřebitele, který je
třeba zaplatit navı́c k ceně jakéhokoli dostupného statku na vertikálně diferencovaných
trzı́ch. Schopnost firem kompenzovat tyto zvýšené náklady spotřebitele tı́m, že účtujı́
nižšı́ ceny, je však pouze omezená. Některé firmy jsou také nuceny zvýšit kvalitu
zbožı́, které nabı́zı́. Pak ovšem již neplatı́ obecný princip výběru maximalizujı́cı́ho
diferenciaci. To, kolik firem bude mı́t kladné tržnı́ podı́ly a zda budou obsluhovat
všechny zákaznı́ky, nenı́ možné určit pouze na základě rozdělenı́ charakteristik zákaznı́ků
(přı́jmu nebo preferencı́). Při zohledněnı́ těchto faktů tato práce diskutuje množstvı́
možných rovnovážných řešenı́, které byly (až na pár výjimek) v existujı́cı́ literatuře dosud
ignorovány.
V prvnı́m článku jsou exogennı́ náklady spotřebitele modelovány jako jednorázová
daň uvalená na přı́jem spotřebitele. Cı́lem je ukázat, že princip maximálnı́ diferenciace
nemusı́ být optimálnı́ strategiı́ při kvalitativnı́m výběru pro libovolnou úroveň exogennı́ch
nákladů. Čı́m je daň vyššı́, tı́m nižšı́ je schopnost (přı́jem) nebo vůle (daná preferencemi)
spotřebitelů platit za kvalitu. Z toho plyne existence kritické úrovně exogennı́ch nákladů,
nad kterou je firma nabı́zejı́cı́ nižšı́ kvalitu nucena zvýšit kvalitu svého zbožı́, aby udržela
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zájem spotřebitele toto zbožı́ koupit. Proto v rovnováze dané zbožı́ nutně nemusı́ být
maximálně diferencované od zbožı́ vyššı́ kvality.
V druhém článku je představen rámec vı́ce trhů, na kterých jsou prodávány dva
komplementárnı́ druhy statků, nezávisle prodávané firmami produkujı́cı́mi jediný statek,
ovšem konzumované v poměru jedna k jedná. To znamená, že každé dva statky různého
druhu tvořı́ vzájemnou kombinaci. Ve výsledku tak statek nabı́zený každou z firem může
figurovat ve vice než jedné kombinaci. V tomto novém uspořádánı́ je ukázáno, že princip
maximálnı́ diferenciace může nabýt nové podoby. Firmy dávajı́ přednost cenám, při nichž
takzvané “kombinace smı́šené kvality”, obsahujı́cı́ jeden statek s vysokou a jeden s nı́zkou
kvalitou, nejsou prodávány.
Ve třetı́m článku je opět analyzován rámec vı́ce trhů, ovšem jedna z firem je od počátku
přı́tomna na obou trzı́ch. Na jednom z trhů čelı́ hrozbě vstupu potenciálnı́ho konkurenta
nabı́zejı́cı́ho zbožı́ vyššı́ kvality, na druhém z trhů čelı́ hrozbě vstupu potenciálnı́ho
konkurenta nabı́zejı́cı́ho zbožı́ nižšı́ kvality. Cı́lem je ukázat, zda by taková firma mohla
na kterémkoli z trhů odradit konkurenta od vstupu na trh tı́m, že bude své zbožı́ prodávat
pouze v kombinaci. Výsledek ukazuje, že na jedné straně nikdy nelze zabránit vstupu
konkurenta s vyššı́ kvalitou, pokud tento vstup posı́lı́ úroveň kvality kombinace nabı́zené
původnı́ firmou, protože v takovém přı́padě benefitujı́ obě firmy. Na druhé straně je
kombinacı́ zbožı́ možné zabránit vstupu konkurenta s nižšı́ kvalitou. Tato schopnost
zabránit vstupu konkurenta však záležı́ předevšı́m na různorodosti spotřebitelských





1 Exogenous Expenses in Industries With Vertical
Product Differentiation and Quality Constraints
In this paper we study how an exogenous expense of owning a market good affects the
equilibrium outcome in a market with vertical product differentiation; i.e. consumers
differ by income but have identical preferences for the good’s quality. For simplicity, the
additional expense is modeled as a lump-sum tax on the consumption of the market good.
Another novelty is that each firm is assumed to face an individual constraint representing
the best quality it could produce.
We identify three possible subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes dependent on the
amount of the exogenous expense.
First, at a small exogenous expense tending to zero, quality choice is characterized by
maximal product differentiation, and all consumers buy one of the two qualities in the
market. Second, at a medium exogenous expense, some low-income consumers refrain
from buying, which incentivizes the producer of the low-quality good to decrease the
quality difference from the high-quality good. Third, at a large exogenous expense at
which the consumers of the low-quality good cannot afford it, the market is monopolized
by the high-quality firm.
The results imply that a lump-sum tax of a moderate size might stimulate the low-quality
producer in a vertically differentiated market to raise the quality of its good, which has
interesting implications about the potential welfare-improving role such a tool could have
in an economy with vertically-differentiated industries.
Keywords: vertical product differentiation, commodity taxation, market participation,
blockaded entry
JEL classification: L11, L13, L15
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1.1 Introduction
In industrial organization theory, markets in which consumers differ by income1 but
have the same preferences for the distinct qualities of the goods offered are defined as
vertically differentiated markets. Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) as well as Shaked and
Sutton (1982, 1983) suggest three standard assumptions that need to hold for an industry
to be modeled as a vertically differentiated market: heterogeneous consumer incomes,
unanimously agreed ranking of the goods by quality, and indivisible and mutually
exclusive purchases (i.e. consumers buy only one unit of the good or none). Examples of
industries that possess these three characteristics are the automotive industry, real estate,
furniture manufacturing, travel, and electronics. Most of these industries, however, share
also a characteristic which is not assumed in the existing models of vertical product
differentiation. Namely, consumers encounter extra expenses of owning and using the
goods supplied by these industries. For instance, in an example given by Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) about how a pianist makes a buying decision in the market for pianos, the
expenditure incurred by the pianist actually includes not only the producer’s price of the
piano itself as assumed in the existing models, but also sales tax, the transportation fee to
move the piano from the shop to her (or his) home, the fee for the piano technician to tune
it after transport, the warranty against hidden defects that might be revealed after the sale,
insurance against damage due to external factors like fire or flood, spare keys and strings,
etc.
In this paper, we address the issue with the previously unexamined effect of exogenous
1In the first model of vertical product differentiation developed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) consumers
differ not by income but by taste for quality. However, Tirole (1988) shows that the consumer’s taste variable
introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978) gives the reciprocal value of the marginal rate of substitution
between income and quality. Intuitively speaking, wealthier consumers value money (income) less and
are therefore more willing to pay for an additional unit of quality. See Tirole, 1988, pp. 96–97.
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expenses in vertically differentiated markets by adding a fourth assumption to the three
standard ones. We introduce a stylized model of a vertically differentiated market where
consumers are assumed to face a fixed exogenous expense of owning the good purchased
in the market.
Another novelty of our approach is the imposition of exogenous constraints on the
quality choices of firms. The range from which a firm can choose the quality of its
good is restricted individually from above and universally from below. This assumption
reflects better the actual choice of a firm. Manufacturers are never free to increase the
quality of their goods infinitely and usually differ in their technological frontiers. That
is, for some period of time the highest feasible quality for a firm might be unachievable
for others in the market due to patent protection or limited access to scarce high-quality
resources necessary for its production. In many industries there are also minimal (safety,
hygiene etc.) requirements for the quality of a product in order for it to be approved
for sale. Distinct from the technological quality restrictions, however, these minimal
requirements must ideally apply the same to all firms in the industry. Further, the
restriction of the quality choices of firms makes it possible to unambiguously identify
each potential market entrant with the quality rank that its good would have after entry.
This makes it possible to explicitly describe how the size of the exogenous expense
that consumers face affects the optimal quality choices of firms, that is, the optimal
differentiation of the goods offered in the market.
The solution of our model allows us to explore the effect of the size of the exogenous
expense on the corresponding equilibrium outcome while using the standard outcome in
the case without exogenous expense as a benchmark.
The standard outcome of the solutions of the models of vertical product differentiation
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is that the structure (respecting the number of firms) and the coveredness2 of the market
at equilibrium do not depend on the quality differences between goods. Instead, they are
fully determined by the length of the support interval of the distribution of the consumer
incomes. Particularly, a sufficiently narrow spread of consumer incomes3 ensures that
even the lowest-income consumer will prefer to buy the second-best quality in the market
rather than to choose the worse quality of a potential third entrant or another non-market
option. Thus, at equilibrium the producer of the second-best quality does not face a
competition from a lower-quality good. Accordingly, it would be optimal to maximally
differentiate the quality of its good from that of the best-quality producer, which is its
only competitor. This solution holds at equilibrium because the quality differentiation
strictly relaxes the competition between the best producer and the second-best producer.
Thus, the larger is the difference between the qualities of the products of the two firms,
the higher will be both their profits. Accordingly, maximal differentiation implies corner
solutions in qualities. That is to say, one of the entrants chooses to produce the highest
possible quality while the other chooses to produce the lowest possible quality that still
distinguishes its good from its best non-market substitute.
Our main objective is to show that the presence of an exogenous expense could lead
to an equilibrium outcome where the lowest-income consumers would find the outside
option more attractive than the second-best quality in the market. We identify a range of
values of the size of the exogenous expense at which even when the spread of consumer
2By ”coveredness” of the market we mean a characterization whether at equilibrium all consumers
willing to buy the market good purchase one of the available qualities so that market (demand) is ”covered”
or there are consumers who choose the outside option (the best free non-market substitute) instead, so that
the market (demand) is ”non-covered”.
3Shaked and Sutton (1982) prove that to have a covered duopoly market at equilibrium given the uniform
distribution of consumer income, it is necessary and sufficient for consumer income to have a support
interval with a right endpoint which is more than two times but at most four times as large as its left
endpoint. The duopoly result (i.e. with finite equilibrium number of entrants) holds even for the case of
free entry; that is when sunk cost is assumed to tend to zero.
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incomes is still sufficiently narrow to prevent the entry of a third entrant, a non-covered
duopoly equilibrium exists. That is, at these values the producer of the second-best
quality faces a competition not only from the best-quality good in the market but also
from a worse-quality non-market good, the free outside option. As a result, the maximal
differentiation will no longer be an optimal choice for both firms in the market. One
of the entrants, which we call the high-quality producer, will still choose to produce the
best possible quality, but the other, which we call the low-quality producer, will deviate
from the corner solution in favor of an internal solution. In particular, at equilibrium the
low-quality producer will not choose a quality for its good which is the closest possible
to that of the outside option, but one that is significantly higher though still below the
quality of the best good in the market. This solution will hold because by choosing a
quality in-between the other two available options in the market, the low-quality producer
does indeed distinguish its product not only from the best good in the market but also
from the outside option. So, here we do not have the classical single-competitor story, but
one where the low-quality producer needs to differentiate the quality of its good from that
of two competitors. This two-competitor differentiation relaxes the competition which
the low-quality firm faces, thus allowing it to maximize its profit.
In our paper, we have chosen to model the exogenous expense in a vertically
differentiated market as a lump-sum tax on consumption of the market good. The
motivation for our choice comes from the fact that the expenses consumers pay on top of
the producer’s price can be divided into two categories: expenses that vary with the quality
of the good (e.g. sales tax, insurance premium, spare keys and strings) and expenses that
are constant in the good’s quality (e.g. transportation fee, tuning fee). Accordingly, the
first category could be modeled as an ad valorem tax or specific tax on consumption
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or production which is already explored in the existing literature, whereas the second
category is more appropriately modeled as a lump-sum tax on consumption.4
The competition effect of proportional taxation on production in vertically
differentiated markets is extensively studied in the literature. Particularly, Cramer and
Thisse (1994) show that by its proportional negative effect on the marginal revenue,
an ad valorem tax will mitigate the quality advantage of the high-quality producer at
a covered-market equilibrium, while Constantatos and Sartzetakis (1999) show that if
the market is not covered, this will result in increased entry of lower-quality producers.
Brécard (2008) compares the effects of the ad valorem tax to the effects of the specific
tax imposed on the producer per unit of its good sold. Both tax regimes have influence
on firms’ revenue because ad valorem tax is proportional to price, while specific tax is
proportional to the market share. The results imply that these taxes negatively affect
demand, qualities, differentiation and profits of the two firms in the market.
To our knowledge, the competition effect of lump-sum taxation on consumption in
a vertically differentiated market has not been studied in the existing literature. In our
model, because we impose a lump-sum tax on consumption, the equilibrium price does
not change due to an increase in firm’s cost, that is by shifting the individual supply curves
up, instead, it negatively affects the buyer’s net income, which shifts the residual demand
curves down. As a result, we are able to study the equilibrium solution in a setting largely
consistent with the original model of Shaked and Sutton (1982), so that we do not need
to relax even its simplifying assumption of zero unit production cost. This allows us to
identify a direct relationship between the size of the tax and the shift from a covered
to non-covered duopoly market, given free entry. It also enables us to describe more
4We are grateful to Jakub Steiner for pointing out the similarity between exogenous expense and
lump-sum consumption tax in his comments to an earlier version of the present paper.
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precisely the competition mechanism that leads to a decrease in the quality differentiation
between the two goods in the market. As noted above, at a tax size at which the market is
not covered, the low-quality producer faces competition from the outside option, which
gives it an incentive to lessen the difference of its products from that of the high-quality
producer.
Our results suggest the existence of three distinct equilibrium outcomes dependent on
the amount of the lump-sum tax imposed on consumers.
The first equilibrium outcome is similar to the case of proportional taxation in the
model of Cramer and Thisse (1994). For a small lump-sum tax tending to zero, the
equilibrium outcome is a covered duopoly. Only the demand share of the high-quality
firm decreases proportionally to the amount of the exogenous expense in favor of the
market share of the low-quality producer.
The second equilibrium outcome corresponds to a medium-sized lump sum tax which
does not tend to zero but is still below the level at which all consumers who would
otherwise buy the low-quality good cannot afford it. As a result, some (although not
all) of the consumers of the low-quality firm switch to the free outside option and the
market is a non-covered duopoly at equilibrium. This is the equilibrium outcome, which
is of primary interest in our paper because it implies an internal solution for the quality
choice of the low-quality firm.
The third equilibrium outcome occurs at and above the lump-sum threshold, where
only consumers who prefer the high-quality good buy in the market, while the rest choose
the outside option. As a result, the producer of the low-quality good cannot make positive
sales. Therefore, the low-quality firm loses incentive to enter the market and there is a
non-covered monopoly structure at equilibrium.
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we introduce the model of a vertically
differentiated market with lump-sum taxation on consumption. In section 1.3 we present
each of the three equilibrium solutions and derive the respective conditions for their
existence in terms of the tax size, income distribution and quality constraints. Section 1.4
summarizes the results and discusses their implications.
1.2 The Model
Here we introduce a model of a market for vertically differentiated goods with a lump-sum
tax imposed on consumers who buy them. To allow for direct comparability, the notation
of the common terms is held the same as in Shaked and Sutton (1982).
Consider N independent firms who are potential entrants to the market. They face the
following three-stage game:
Stage 1: Firms simultaneously decide to enter the market or not.
Before making an entry decision each potential entrant is assigned an individual
exogenously defined upper bound on its quality.5 Each potential entrant is identified by
the sequential number n ∈ [1,N] of its quality upper bound (ūn) in descending order:
ū1 > ū2 > ū3 > ... > ūn > ūn+1 > ... > ūN (1)
where:
ūn - upper bound on quality choice with rank n, n = 1,2, ...,N.
Based on its assignment, each firm independently decides whether to enter the market
or not. In the real world firms may face quality constraints as in (1) if, for example,
5This assumption ensures only distinct quality choices in equilibrium. For a solution without quality
constraints which also allows for classical Bertrand homogeneous-good equilibrium, see Shaked and
Sutton, 1982, p.10.
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quality-enhancing technologies are patent-protected6.
Stage 2: Entrants make a quality choice simultaneously.
Let K entrants be in the market after the first stage, K ≤ N. Each actual entrant
is identified by the sequential number k ∈ [1,K] of its quality upper bound (ūnk) in a
subsequence of the initial sequence in (1). The subsequence is formed by arranging
in descending order the quality bounds of the actual entrants only.7 Accordingly, each
entrant k chooses the quality uk (k = 1,2, ...,K) of its good so that the following inequality
must hold:8
uk ≤ ūnk ,k = 1,2, ...,K,K < N (2)
where:
uk - quality choice of entrant with upper bound re-ranked to k
ūnk - k-th element of sub-sequence from sequence {ūn}
N
n=1
Stage 3: Firms compete in prices simultaneously
Each firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the form of quality-price pair. For
simplicity, as in Shaked and Sutton (1982), the production costs are assumed to be zero.
Therefore, each firm sets the price that maximizes its revenue as follows:
max
pk,uk
Rk = pkDk (p1, ..., pk, ..., pK) ,k = 1, ...,K (3)
where:
6For a stylized model of patent race see Loury (1979).
7Alternatively, qualities could be indexed in ascending order as in Shaked and Sutton (1982). Here, we
arrange them in descending order, to make indices independent on the number of entrants so that the entrant
with highest quality is always indexed by number 1, the entrant with the second-best quality is indexed by 2
and so on till the last entrant, who is indexed by K.
8In our model, the rank k of a good in the quality constraint sequence is meant to play the same role
of a unique quality identifier as its brand does in the real world. Hereby, we are able to unambiguously
determine which potential entrant will enter as a quality leader, and which one as its immediate follower.
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Rk - revenue of the entrant providing good with quality rank k in the market,
k = 1,2, ...,K
pk - price of good with quality rank k
Dk (p1, ..., pk, ..., pK) - demand for good with quality rank k
The demand for a quality-ranked good coincides with the number of consumers who
choose to buy it. This is implied by the standard assumption that consumers make
indivisible and mutually exclusive purchases (i.e. buy one or none) from among the K
qualities available in the market.9 Consumers are also assumed to form a continuum so
that there is no difference between market share and demand for quality. To explicitly
derive the market shares of the qualities in the market, the consumer’s side of the market
is defined below.
Consumer’s preferences are given by the following utility function of a simplified
Cobb-Douglas form:
U (k,x) = ukx (4)
where:
U (k,x) - utility function of a consumer who buys a good with quality rank k
x - the consumption of all the other (’non-quality’) goods represented by the quantity
of a composite good that is accordingly taken to be a numéraire good with a unit price.
We have twofold reason to choose the functional form in (4). Intuitively, consuming
a better quality good should enhance the comfort and enjoyment of the other goods
consumed together with it. Therefore, it makes sense to assume that the quality variable
9 ”...this is necessarily the case if the choice of a consumer concerns indivisible products which, by their
very nature, are either bought in a single unit of a single brand or not bought at all. So are cars, TV’s,
washing machines, stereo chains, pianos, a.s.o.” (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979, p. 340).
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uk is an augmenting factor of the quantity variable x. The second argument to choose the
functional form in (4) is that the exact indirect utility function introduced by Shaked and
Sutton (1982) could be derived from it, as shown below.
We make a simplifying assumption common for the non-representative consumer
models of product differentiation. Specifically, that the identifying characteristics of
consumers, which in our model is their gross income, is assumed to be uniformly
distributed according to a density that equals unity on some support 0 < a ≤ t ≤ b.
Respectively, each consumer maximizes her/his utility subject to the following budget
constraint:
pk + x≤ t−T (5)
where:
t - gross consumer income, t ∼U [a,b]
T - amount of the lump-sum tax imposed on the consumption of the market good.
So long as both prices are positive and smaller than the income, the consumer problem
has an internal solution, so that the budget constraint is binding. This allows the amount of
the numéraire good consumed to be expressed through the prices and consumer’s budget
as follows:
x = t−T − pk (6)





U (k, t) = uk (t−T − pk) (7)
This reduced-form utility function is directly assumed to represent the common
consumer preferences by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982).
The value function that corresponds to the solution gives the indirect utility
function Vk(t, pk).
To rule out a situation where a consumer participates in the market although her/his
budget cannot cover the price plus tax of either of the available qualities, a free
non-taxable outside offer is also made available to the consumers. It has a quality of
u0 and zero price p0 = 0 at which the utility function in (7) takes the following reduced
form:
U (k = 0, t) = u0t (8)
Note that the utility from the outside option is always non-negative even when the
consumer who chooses it has zero gross income.
The derivation of the quality demands follows from the solution of the optimization
problem in (7). Note that (7) implies that the utility from a good with quality rank k
increases linearly in the gross income of the consumer. Therefore, on figure 1, the curve
representing the utility from quality uk as a function of a consumer’s gross income is a
straight line.10
10A graph similar to Figure 1 has been employed by Giannakas (2011) to illustrate the derivation of
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Figure 1: Deriving the quality demands as solutions to the utility-maximization problems
The market share of quality uk is given by the intersection of the two subsets[
tk/k+1, tk−1/k
]
and [ a,b ]that gives the subset of the feasible consumer incomes at
which its utility (line) is the highest. D(C k)k represents the market share of uk when




. D(NC k)k represents the market share of uk when it




. D(>k)k represents the
market share of uk when there is a lower quality uk+1 (K > k).
On Figure 1, the crossing point between any two utility curves gives the marginal gross
income at which a consumer would be indifferent between the qualities they represent.
Particularly, at marginal income tk−1/k the consumer is indifferent between quality uk−1
and quality uk while at marginal income tk/k+1 the consumer is indifferent between quality
uk and quality uk+1.
The assumptions for unit-consumption and uniform distribution of incomes in the
interval [ a,b ] imply that the market share of quality uk is given by the intersection




and [ a,b ].
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Accordingly, there are three possibilities.
First, if the marginal incomes tk−1/k and tk/k+1 belong to the support interval of the
consumer income distribution, tk/k+1 ∈ [ a,b ]
∧
tk−1/k ∈ [ a,b ], both uk and uk+1 would
have positive market share so that uk is not the lowest quality in the market, (K > k). To
distinguish the market share in this case, we denote it by (> k).
Second, if tk−1/k belongs to the support interval of the consumer income distribution
and tk/k+1 is excluded from it, tk−1/k ∈ [ a,b ]
∧
tk/k+1 /∈ [ a,b ], uk will be the lowest
quality with positive market share. Given that the lowest-income consumer prefers it to
the quality of the outside option u0, i.e. tk/0 ≤ a, it will also cover the market. Therefore,
we denote this case by (C k).
Third, when uk is the lowest quality with positive market share but the lowest-income
consumer prefers the outside option u0 to it, i.e. tk/0 > a, the market is not covered. We
denote this case by (NC k).




D(C k)k = tk−1/k−a, if tk/k+1 < tk/0 ≤ a < tk−1/k < b
D(NC k)k = tk−1/k− tk/0, if tk/k+1 ≤ a < tk/0 < tk−1/k < b
D(>k)k = tk−1/k− tk/k+1, if max[tk+1/0,a]< tk/k+1 < tk−1/k < b
0, if tk/k+1 < tk−1/k ≤ a < b
(9)
where:
Dk – demand share of good with quality rank k, k = 2, . . . ,K
D(C k)k – demand share of good with quality rank k when it covers (C) the market,
i.e. tk/k+1 ≤ a, k = 2, . . . ,K
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D(NC k)k – demand share of good with quality rank k when it has the lowest quality but




D(>k)k – demand share of good with quality rank k when its quality is not the lowest in
the market (K > k)
We ignore the case when tk/k+1 belongs to the support interval of the consumer
income distribution and tk−1/k is excluded from it, tk/k+1 ∈ [ a,b ] ∪ tk−1/k /∈ [ a,b ],
because by definition this cannot be an equilibrium outcome. The higher quality rank
(as unanimously agreed by all consumers) of uk−1 relative to uk implies that the former
cannot be efficiently undercut by the latter at equilibrium. On the contrary, even if quality
uk−1 is priced slightly higher than uk, it would still be preferred by the consumer at any
income level.
When k = 1, however, there is no better quality in the market, so its demand share is
bounded from above by the maximum income b itself, as shown below:
D1 =

D(C k)1 = b−a, if t1/2 < t1/0 ≤ a < b
D(NC k)k = b− t1/0, if t1/2 ≤ a < t1/0 < b
D(>1)k = b− t1/2, if max[t2/0,a]< t1/2 < b
0, if a < b < t1/2
(10)
Finally, the demand functions Dk (p1, ..., pk, ..., pK), k = 1, ..,K, in (3) can be derived
in explicit form by expressing the demand shares in (10) and (11) in terms of prices. For
the purpose, we need to first express the marginal incomes. The general expression for
the marginal consumer’s income tk/k+1 can be derived by equalizing the utility function
15
















tk/k+1 - the marginal gross income that would make a consumer indifferent between
buying quality uk or quality uk+1 at the market prices at which these qualities are supplied
given the lump-sum tax T .
The expression for the income at which the utility curves of uk and u0 cross each other








The result in (13) differs from (12) because the outside option is free and non-taxable.











uk−u0 T , if p̂k < pk <





ˆ̂pk < pk < p̄k (> k)







a−T – price level at which there is a kink in the demand for the good with




– price level at which there is another kink in the
demand for the good with quality rank k because below that price it undercuts the goods




– price level at and above which for any
consumer’s income the good with quality rank k is less preferred to its nearest competitor
by rank, which excludes it from the market.
The if-conditions in (14) can be also imposed on T . For example, the condition for the
market to be covered by the last entrant K is:
T ≤ uK−u0
uK
a− p(C K)K (15)
where:
p(C K)K – optimal price of the last entrant with quality rank K if it is expected to cover
the market




a− p(NC K)K (16)
where:
p(NC K)K – optimal price of the last entrant with quality rank K if it is expected not to
cover the market
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The demand function for the best quality in terms of prices is also double-kinked:
D1 =

b−a, if p1 ≤ p̂1 (C 1)
b− u1 p1u1−u0 −
u1T
u1−u0 , if p̂1 < p1 ≤
ˆ̂p1 (N 1)
b− u1 p1−u2 p2u1−u2 −T, if
ˆ̂p1 < p1 < p̄1 (> 1)






a−T – price level at which there is a kink in the demand curve of the good
with quality rank 1 because below that price it covers the market.
ˆ̂p1 =
u2(u1−u0)p2+u0(u1−u2)T
u1(u2−u0) – price level at which there is another kink in the demand
curve of the good with quality rank 1 because below that price it undercuts the goods with




– price level at and above which for any consumer’s income
the good with quality rank 1 is less preferred to its nearest competitor by rank, which
excludes it from the market.
Note that both the expressions in (14) and (17) consist of three distinct linear functions
that are related differently to price and tax. For example, the (C k) segment of the
conditional demand function in (14) is less sensitive to price pk (i.e. steeper) than the
(NC k) segment. The former is positively related to the amount of the lump sum (i.e.
parallelly shifting to the right when T increases) while the latter is negatively related
to the amount of the lump sum (i.e. parallelly shifting to the left when T increases).
Therefore, at different amounts of the lump sum, the residual demand curves change not
only their locations but also their shapes, which implies a difference in the segment to
which the optimal solution belongs.
18
In the next section, we apply the concept of Selten’s (1975) subgame perfect
equilibrium and solve the model by backwards induction to identify three distinct optimal
outcomes characterized by the structure and the coveredness of the market at different
lump sums of the tax on consumption.
We first derive the conditions on a, b and T for having a covered duopoly outcome
at equilibrium and show that it is not independent of the quality choices of the
entrants. Further, we specify the conditions on the individual quality upper bounds for
having alternative equilibrium solutions at larger amounts of the lump sum, respectively
non-covered duopoly and non-covered monopoly.
1.3 Equilibrium Solutions
1.3.1 Covered Duopoly Equilibrium With Small Lump-sum Tax
Given K entrants in the market, we can explicitly express their revenue-maximization















− uk pk−uk+1 pk+1
uk−uk+1
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The optimal solution for prices in the last subgame implies the following sequence of
inequality relationships between the marginal incomes tk/k+1 and the endpoints a and b
of the support interval of the consumer income distribution:11




















Hence, if the maximum income b satisfies the constraint below:
b≤ 4a−3T (22)
the following inequality would characterize the equilibrium with more than two entrants:
a > tk−1/k > tk/0,k = 3, . . . ,K for K > 2 (23)
That is, when (22) holds for all firms that decide to enter the market in the first stage,
at most two would have positive market share and therefore would remain in the market
at equilibrium. Note that this result is not affected by the coveredness of the market. So,
(22) would ensure efficient foreclosure of a potential third entrant (a > t2/3) even in the
case of non-covered equilibrium market outcome, which is studied in the next subsection.
In this subsection, we are interested in the conditions for having a covered duopoly at
equilibrium. Therefore, we assume that condition (22) holds and the market is covered by
two entrants with ranks 1 and 2, respectively. The corresponding subgame equilibrium is
11The result in (21) is derived from the system of revenue-maximizing first-order conditions with respect
to prices as in Shaked and Sutton, 1982, p.5.
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given by the following expressions for the optimal prices in terms of the qualities of the



















p(C 2)1 – price choice of firm 1 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
p(C 2)2 – price choice of firm 2 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
u(C 2)1 – quality choice of firm 1 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
u(C 2)2 – quality choice of firm 2 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium











D(C 2)1 – market share of firm 1 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
D(C 2)2 – market share of firm 2 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
Both expressions in (25) are positive if the maximum income b satisfies the constraint
below:
b > 2a−T (26)
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Combining conditions (22) and (26) gives us the following inequality:
2a−T < b≤ 4a−3T (27)
that must be satisfied for having two entrants with positive market shares at equilibrium
provided that the market is covered. Note that in case of zero additional expense to
the consumer, T =0, the inequality in (27) coincides with Shaked and Sutton’s (1982)
condition for a covered duopoly equilibrium. Distinct from this, however, there are some
sufficiently large positive values of T for which (27) would not hold. For its right-hand
side to be larger than its left-hand side, the tax should not exceed the minimum consumer
income a.
T < a (28)
Condition (22) is not sufficient to have a covered market equilibrium at T > 0. For
the purpose, we introduce an additional condition on T which is not independent of the
quality choices of the firms at the second stage. Before deriving it, we need to first present
the solution for the quality-choice subgame equilibrium at the second stage. We express
the revenues of the two entrants in terms of their qualities by taking the pairwise products




















R(C 2)1 – profit/revenue of firm 1 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
R(C 2)2 – profit/revenue of firm 2 in the case of a covered duopoly equilibrium
Both expressions in (29) are increasing in the higher quality u1 and decreasing in the
lower quality u2 which implies the following set of optimal quality choices in the second
stage:
u(C 2)1 = ū1
u(C 2)2 = u2
(30)
where:
u2 – the lowest quality that the entrant with quality constraint of rank 2 could choose
so that its good is still better than the outside option, u2 = u0 + ε,ε → 0,ε > 0.
We derive the condition for a covered market by substituting for the optimal price
p(C 2)2 from (24) in (15) for K=2:
T ≤ a(2ū1 +u2−3u0)−b(ū1−u2)
ū1 +2u2
(31)
For simplicity, we denote the right-hand side of (31) by T (C 2) that stands for the upper
bound on the lump-sum tax size below which a covered duopoly equilibrium exists.
If we substitute for b by the left-hand side of (27) in the right-hand side of (31), we
derive an expression that must still be larger than T (C 2):




because T (C 2) is strictly decreasing in b. However, the inequality in (32) is valid only if
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That is, if (33) does not hold we cannot have a covered market at equilibrium because
the inequality condition in (31) will be violated. This result is especially interesting
because it implies that the market can be a covered duopoly at equilibrium only if T
is extremely small, almost zero, as by definition ε tends to zero.
The joint validity of conditions (2), (27) and (31) ensures the existence of a unique
covered duopoly equilibrium which is established in proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. Let the consumer income distribution satisfy condition (27) and the
restrictions from above on the quality choices in (2) and on the amount of the lump-sum
tax in (31) hold. Then, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists at which exactly the
entrants with quality ranks 1 and 2 enter the market, make the quality choice in (30) and
set the corresponding prices in (24). The firms’ market shares and profits are given by the
respective expressions in (25) and (29). The market is covered.
The intuition behind proposition 1 can be illustrated by plotting the residual demand
curves of firm 1 and 2 according to the expressions for their demand functions in (14)
and (17) as shown on figure 2 below. Since marginal cost is assumed to be zero for both
entrants, the equilibrium solutions are given by the points of unit elasticity in their residual
demand curves. That is, if we take the segment to which the unit elasticity point belongs
as a linear demand curve itself, the unit elasticity point would be equally distant from its
intersections with the horizontal and vertical axes.
Generally, the amount of expense T is negatively related to the net income of the buyers
in the market. Therefore, its imposition leads to a shift in the residual demand curves.
However, the assumption of indivisibility and mutual exclusivity of goods does not imply
the classical parallel shift of the overall demand curve to the left. As the expressions in
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(14) and (17) show, the magnitude and the direction of the demand curve shift vary across
its segments. As a result, at different values of T the unit elasticity point would move
from one segment to another, thus implying distinct equilibrium outcomes.
What we have shown so far is that in the particular case when the support interval
of the distribution of consumer incomes complies with the inequalities in (27) and the
additional expense T satisfies the restriction from above in (31), the unit elasticity points
belong to the highest segment of the residual demand curve of firm 1 and to the middle





























(2.A)  (2.B)  
Figure 2: Solution for equilibrium with covered duopoly outcome
Panel (2.A) represents the residual demand curve of a good with quality rank 1 as
given in (17) at the small tax established in (31). The optimal solution is given by
the unit-elastic point with coordinates (D(C 2)1 , p
(C 2)
1 ) which belongs to the segment
(>1) above the price ˆ̂p(C 2)1 at which at least one more entrant with a worse good is
accommodated in the market. Panel (2.B) illustrates the demand for the good with
quality rank 2 as given in (14) for k = 2 at the small tax established in (33). The
optimal solution is given by the unit-elastic point with coordinates (D(C 2)2 , p
(C 2)
2 )
which belongs to the bottom segment (C 2) below the price p̂2 at which the market
is exactly covered by the second-best quality.
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1.3.2 Non-Covered Duopoly Equilibrium With Middle Lump-sum Tax
In this subsection, we establish the conditions for a non-covered duopoly outcome at
equilibrium.
Let the condition in (22) hold, so that there are at most two entrants. Now, however,
the market is assumed to be non-covered. The corresponding subgame equilibrium at the
pricing stage is given by the following set of optimal prices for the two entrants:
p(NC 2)1 =
(
































p(NC 2)1 – price choice of firm 1 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
p(NC 2)2 – price choice of firm 2 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
u(NC 2)1 – quality choice of firm 1 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
u(NC 2)2 – quality choice of firm 2 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
Substituting for the optimal prices from (34) into (16) for K=2 yields the following






























































D(NC 2)1 – market share of firm 1 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
D(NC 2)2 – market share of firm 2 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium










It is trivial that the condition on u(NC 2)2 is stricter and should also be valid for u
(NC 2)
1
which by definition is set to be bigger than u(NC 2)2 :






Hence, the optimal choice of the producer of the lower-quality good u(NC 2)2 must vary
in the interval (b+Tb−T u0, u
(NC 2)
1 ). Otherwise, it will either have no sales or it will not be
the lower-quality producer.
Note also that the inequality condition in (38) can hold only as long as the lump-sum






For simplicity we will denote the right-hand side of (39) by T (NC 2) that stands for
upper bound of the lump-sum tax above which firm 2 would not have positive demand
because its customers cannot afford to pay such a high tax.
After substituting for the optimal demands from (36) and for the optimal prices
























































R(NC 2)1 – profit/revenue of firm 1 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
R(NC 2)2 – profit/revenue of firm 2 in the case of a non-covered duopoly equilibrium
As we will show below, only firm 1 has a corner solution for its optimal quality u(NC 2)1 ,
while firm 2 has an internal solution for its optimal quality u(NC 2)2 . This is a key difference
that distinguishes the solution for qualities in case of a non-covered duopoly from the
maximal differentiation solution in case of a covered duopoly.
As a first step to show that the non-covered solution in qualities is different, we
compare the results for the optimal market shares in (36) with the corresponding
results for the optimal prices in (34) to note that the latter could be considered to be
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The latter observation should not come as a surprise, given that by construction the
demand functions of the two goods in (14) and (17) are linear in their own prices.
Note also that for at least a consumer to remain solvent, the lump-sum tax should not
exceed the highest consumer income, i.e. b > T . Hence, when (38) holds, the expression













)2 < 0 (42)
The additional operator that transforms the market share expression of the high-quality









2 > 0 (43)
Hence, it is not straightforward to conclude whether the optimal price is increasing or
decreasing in the quality of firm 1. To identify the sign of the correlation between the
two, we analyze the first order condition of the expression of the optimal price in (34)










































3(b−T )u(NC 2)2 +(b+T )u0
) (45)
because its discriminant is strictly negative when (38) holds.
Note also that the coefficient before the squared argument in the numerator of (44) is
strictly positive, which implies that the squared function in the numerator has an absolute
minimum. Furthermore, the minimum value must be positive, because otherwise the
function would have had real roots. Since the minimum value of the numerator is positive,
the whole expression in (44) must also be strictly positive. So, we can conclude that the




It is trivial that the transforming operator in (41) is smaller than 1 for any feasible u1.
Therefore, the optimal price cannot exceed the value of the optimal market share.
Analogously, note that we could represent the revenue of firm 1 as a product of the























Since the transforming operator is smaller than 1, the revenue must approach the
squared market share from below as u1 tends to infinity. As we have already shown in (42)
the demand for good 1 is positive and strictly decreasing in u1 when (38) holds. Therefore,
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after being squared, it should still be strictly decreasing, approaching a certain positive
limit as u1 tends to infinity. Accordingly, the revenue of firm 1 must be approaching the












In other words, the revenue of firm 1 must be strictly increasing in u1. So, as in
the solution for covered duopoly, the optimal quality choice of firm 1 in a non-covered
duopoly setting is again given by the upper bound on its quality:
u(NC 2)1 = ū1 (49)
Now we move to analysis of the optimal quality choice of firm 2 in case of non-covered
market duopoly, which leads to the key implication of the current paper. Specifically,
firm 2 has an incentive to increase the quality of its good when the market is not covered,
so that the outside option reveals itself as an external inferior competitor. To demonstrate
this, we substitute for the optimal quality choice of firm 1 in the expression for the































because when the condition in (38) holds its discriminant is negative.
Note also that the coefficient before the squared argument in the numerator of (50) is
strictly positive, which implies that the squared function in the numerator has an absolute
minimum. Furthermore, the minimum value must be positive, because otherwise the
function would have had real roots. Since the minimum value of the numerator is positive,
the whole expression in (50) must also be strictly positive. So, we can conclude that the




Since the revenue of firm 2 is given by the product of its market share and its price,
when both are increasing in the quality u2 the whole revenue must be increasing in it
as well. Note however that the price of good 2 in (34) cannot be positively correlated
with its quality for any value in the interval defined by (38). At the endpoints of the
interval, the price of good 2 would be zero, while in-between it would be strictly positive.
Hence, up to some critical value of u2 in the interval defined by (38), the price must be
increasing, but then it should start decreasing. To show this explicitly, we analyze the




(2(2b−T )u0−3(b−T )ū1)u22−2(b+T )ū1u0u2+(b+T )(4ū1−3u0)ū1u0
(4ū1−u2−3u0)2u22
(53)
The sign of the coefficient in front of the squared term in the numerator of (53) depends
on the relationship between the maximum income b and the size of the lump-sum tax T as
well as on the qualities of good 1 and the outside option. It is negative when the lump-sum
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tax is large enough relative to the maximum income b:









or alternatively if the upper bound on the quality choice of firm 1 is sufficiently larger
than u0




























The second root is strictly negative. Therefore, for u0 < u2 < u
(1)
2 , the price of good 2
is increasing in its quality while for u(1)2 < u2 < u1, it is decreasing.
Alternatively, when neither (54) nor (55) hold:








the quadratic function in the numerator of (53) is convex and both its roots in (57) are
positive.






(b+T )(ū1−u0)(2(b−T )ū1−(2b−T )u0)ū1u0
2(2b−T )u0−3(b−T )ū1
< 0 (58)
so that again for u0 < u2 < u
(1)
2 , the price of good 2 is increasing in its quality, while for
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u(1)2 < u2 < u1, it is decreasing.
Hence, u(1)2 is the critical value up to which the price of good 2, respectively the
revenue of firm 2, is increasing in its quality within the interval defined by (38). At
the upper bound of the interval, however, the optimal revenue of firm 2 is zero because
as discussed above, its optimal price is zero. This implies that there must be a critical
value in the interval between u(1)2 and u1 beyond which, within the expression of firm 2’s
revenue, the positive effect of the quality of good 2 on the market share of firm 2 will be
dominated by its negative effect on the price of good 2. Accordingly, if exceeded by the
upper bound on the quality choice of firm 2 12, this critical value which we denote by u∗2
will in fact be the revenue-maximizing quality choice of firm 2:
u(NC 2)2 = u
∗
2{= argmaxu2
R2 < u2} (59)
After substituting for the optimal quality choices of firm 1 and firm 2 in (35), the
condition on the size of the lump-sum tax T for the existence of a non-covered duopoly









Keep in mind that u∗2 is not a parameter but a variable which represents the optimal
solution for the quality of good 2 as a function of the lump-sum tax T . However, since
the price of good 2 decreases as the quality difference from the leader is shrinking, i.e.,
it is negatively related to the quality of good 2 at u∗2(> u
(1)
2 ), the right-hand side of the
12If u∗2 is larger than the upper bound on the quality choice of firm 2, the latter will be the optimal solution,
which still implies a shift from the maximal differentiation outcome in the case of covered-market duopoly
equilibrium. So, we could consider it a special case of the internal solution. Accordingly, for the sake of
brevity, we discuss the internal solution only.
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expression in (60) must be strictly increasing in u∗2. So, the critical value of the tax above
which there exists a non-covered duopoly equilibrium has a fixed upper bound:




where by T (NC 2) we denote the fixed lower bound on the lump-size for having a
non-covered duopoly equilibrium. The right-hand side of (61) is derived from (60) where
u∗2 is substituted by u2.
It is straightforward to show that the lower-bound constraint on the lump-sum tax
whose maximum value is represented by T (NC 2) is strictly smaller than its upper-bound
constraint T (NC 2):
T (NC 2)−T (NC 2) = (u2−u0)(4u1−u2−3u0)((b−a)u2−au0)
(u2 +u0)(3u1u2− (u1 +2u2)u0)
> 0 (62)
provided that the exogenous constraint on the quality of good 2 is sufficiently larger than





It is also trivial that the lower-bound condition on the lump-sum tax for having a
non-covered duopoly solution as given by the right-hand side of (60) does strictly exceed
the upper-bound constraint T (C 2):
T (NC 2)−T (C 2) > 0 (64)
because the general functional form of the right-hand sides of (15) and (16) is strictly
increasing in u2 while u∗2 is larger than u2 by definition.
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Hence, (39) and (60) define a range of feasible values of T for which a unique
non-covered duopoly equilibrium would exist, provided that the inequality conditions
in (2), (27), (59) and (63) hold. The result is established in proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. Let the consumer income distribution satisfy (27), the restrictions from
above on the quality choices in (2) as well as the restrictions from below on the upper
quality constraint of the low-quality firm 2 in (59) and (63) hold. Then, given a lump-sum
tax sufficiently large for (60) to hold but still not so high as to exceed the upper bound
in (39), a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists at which the entrants with quality
ranks 1 and 2 enter the market, make the quality choices in (49) and (59) respectively,
and set the corresponding prices in (34). The firms’ optimal market shares and profits are
given by the expressions in (36) and (40). The market is non-covered.
The intuition behind proposition 2 is illustrated in figure 3 below. Note that the price
at the kink p̂2 exceeds the unit-elasticity point only so long as T is too small to satisfy the
condition in (32). Otherwise, for larger T ’s the middle segment shifts parallelly to the left
while the bottom segment shifts parallelly to the right so that the kink between the two
segments is moved below the optimal unit-elastic point. That is, at the equilibrium prices
the lowest-income consumer would prefer the free outside option to paying the high tax
implied by the inequality in (60). However, the upper-bound constraint in (39) ensures
that the optimal price of firm 1 still belongs to the top segment of its residual demand
curve, so that firm 2 faces positive demand. Therefore, the corresponding equilibrium
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Figure 3: Solution for equilibrium with non-covered duopoly outcome
Panel (3.A) represents the residual demand curve of a good with quality rank 1 as
given in (17) at a middle lump-sum payment that satisfies (60) and (39). The optimal
solution occurs at the unit-elastic point with coordinates (D(NC 2)1 , p
(NC 2)
1 ) which
belongs to the segment (>1) above the price ˆ̂p1 even though the larger lump-sum
tax as defined by (60) relative to (33) reduces its length in favor of the middle
segment. Panel (3.B) illustrates the demand for the good with quality rank 2 as given
in (14) for k = 2 at the middle lump-sum payment that satisfies (60) and (39). The
optimal solution occurs at the unit-elastic point with coordinates (D(NC 2)2 , p
(NC 2)
2 )
which belongs to the middle segment (NC 2) above the price p̂2 at which the market
would otherwise be exactly covered by the second-best quality good. Therefore, the
market is not covered at the depicted equilibrium.
Before closing the section, note that (60) is never consistent with (22) if T = 0.
Therefore, in Shaked and Sutton (1982), the inequalities in (27) are not only necessary
but also sufficient conditions for having a covered duopoly outcome, which is the unique
equilibrium solution in the standard case of vertical product differentiation without
exogenous expense. Accordingly, figure 4 below illustrates how the imposition of a
lump-sum payment, large enough to satisfy condition (60), makes the existence of a
non-covered market equilibrium possible. For the purpose, we use the original graphical
representation from Shaked and Sutton (1982), where firms’ best price responses are
expressed implicitly through their impact on the relation between the marginal taste
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[b− t2/0(V̄ −1)+C̄1T ] (65)
tL1/2 =

a+ t2/0(V −1)− (C1−1)T, if t2/0 ≤ a
t2/0(V̄ +1)− (C̄1−1)T, if t2/0 > a
(66)
where:
tH1/2 – implicit best-response function of the high-quality producer, i.e. firm 1
tL1/2 – implicit best-response function of the low-quality producer, i.e. firm 2
For expositional simplicity and easier comparability to Shaked and Sutton’s (1982)
results, we borrow the following supplementary notations, which here are especially
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Figure 4: Implicit solutions for covered market equilibrium at T = 0 and for non-covered
duopoly equilibrium at T > 0 when conditions (35) and (39) hold
The equilibrium marginal incomes, t∗2/0 and t
∗
1/2, which demarcate the market shares
of firm 1 and firm 2 are given by the coordinates of the point of intersection of their
implicit best-response curves, tH1/2 and t
L
1/2, respectively. Panel (4.A) represents the
solution without tax suggested by Shaked and Sutton (1982) . When the condition
in (22) holds as a given that T = 0, the vertical intercept of the downward-sloping
linear curve tH1/2 cannot be larger than twice the value of a. At the same time, V
is trivially larger than 1 so that the lowest point of segment III exceeds more than
twice a. Therefore, the two best-response curves cannot intersect at a point that
belongs to segment III i.e. there cannot be a non-covered market at equilibrium
when T = 0. Panel (4.B) represents the solution for positive tax that satisfies
conditions (35) and (39). The vertical intercept of tH1/2 increases in T , while the
lowest point of segment III shifts down as T increases, which makes it possible for
the two best-response curves to intersect at a point that belongs to segment III; i.e.
there is a non-covered market equilibrium. 13
1.3.3 Non-Covered Monopoly Equilibrium With Large Lump-sum Tax
This final subsection represents the equilibrium solution at an amount of the lump sum T




13Note also that as the lump sum of the tax T increases, the best-response curve of firm 2 shifts
down, moving the equilibrium solution below the 45-degree bisector where t∗2/0 would exceed t
∗
1/2 so that
condition (38) would be violated and firm 2 could not have a positive market share. This gives firm 2 an
incentive to raise the quality of its good, that is, to decrease the quality differentiation, which shifts up
segment III of firm 2’s best-response curve and makes it and the best-response curve of firm 1 steeper.
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provided that the condition in (22) for having at most two entrants with positive market
shares holds.
Since firm 2 cannot make positive sales, it has no incentive to enter the market.
So, only firm 1 enters at the first stage and acts as a monopolist. The corresponding






u(NC 1)1 = u1
(69)
where:
p(NC 1)1 – the optimal price of firm 1 given non-covered monopoly outcome
u(NC 1)1 – the optimal quality choice of firm 1 given non-covered monopoly outcome














D(NC 1)1 – the optimal market share of firm 1 given non-covered monopoly outcome
R(NC 1)1 – the optimal revenue of firm 1 given non-covered monopoly outcome
A non-covered equilibrium would exist so long as b satisfies the following condition:
b > 2a− u1
u1−u0
T{< 2a−T} (71)
which is trivially satisfied when the left-hand side inequality condition in (27) holds.
The subgame equilibrium is established in proposition 3 below.
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Proposition 3. Given that the consumer income distribution satisfies (27) the
restrictions from above on the quality choices in (2) as well as the restriction from below
on the lump-sum tax in(68) hold. Then, a unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists at
which only the entrant with quality rank 1 enters the market, makes the quality choice
and sets the price in (69). Firm 1’s market share and profit are given by the respective
expressions in (70). The market is non-covered.
The intuition behind proposition 3 is illustrated in figure 5 below. The middle segment
of the residual demand curve of firm 1 experiences a parallel shift further to the left when
(68) holds. Therefore, the optimal price of firm 1 belongs to the middle segment where
consumers buy either the best quality or the free outside option.
 
 



























Figure 5: Solution for equilibrium with non-covered monopoly outcome
Panel (5.A) represents the residual demand curve of a good with quality rank 1
as given in (17) at a high tax that exceeds T (NC 2) as implied by the condition
in (68). The optimal solution is given by the unit-elastic point with coordinates
(D(NC 1)1 , p
(NC 1)
1 ). It belongs to the middle segment (NC 1) that is shifted to the
left and down so that it has no positive border price p̂1 with the bottom segment.
As a result, the market is non-covered and no other firm with lower quality is
accommodated in the market. Correspondingly, in Panel (5.B) the optimal solution
of a potential second entrant coincides with the origin of the coordination system –
it could not make positive sales even if its good was priced at zero and its quality
was set at its upper-bound constraint u2.
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1.3.4 Summary of the Effects of the Lump-sum Tax Size
Based on the equilibria defined in the three propositions of the current section we could
make a general conjecture about the effect of the size of the lump-sum tax on the
structure and the coveredness of the market when the distribution of consumer incomes
is determined by the condition in (27). The propositions identify three ranges of the
lump-sum tax T , for which we have three unique pure-strategy equilibria that imply
distinct market outcomes characterized by the number of firms in the market and its
coveredness. These ranges are illustrated in figure 6 below.
 
 









NC_2  NC_1 
a  b  
Condition for at most 2 entrants violated No market 
T  
Figure 6: Effect of the size of the lump-sum tax T on the structure and the coveredness
of the market
For a small lump-sum tax not exceeding T (C 2), we have exactly two firms with
positive market shares and covered market (denoted by C 2). For a moderate tax
size within the range between T (NC 2) and T (NC 2), again exactly two firms enter
the market but they do not cover the whole market, so some of the low-income
consumers prefer the outside option (denoted by NC 2). Accordingly, for very large
tax size at least equal to T (NC 2) but not exceeding the lowest consumer income a,
there is only one entrant and the market is not covered at equilibrium (denoted
by C 1).
There are also two intervals of the values of T for which we cannot provide an explicit
solution based on the analysis so far. For values of T within the closed interval between
T (C 2) and T (NC 2) an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. If firms play their pure
quality-price strategies expecting a covered duopoly, the outcome will be a non-covered
market, and vice versa when they expect a non-covered market, the market will be
a covered duopoly. Therefore, instead, an equilibrium in mixed strategies must exist
where firm 2 chooses better quality than in case of maximal differentiation but still lower
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than at the pure-strategy non-covered duopoly equilibrium established in proposition 2.
Accordingly, the prices of the two firms will be higher but still below the optimal price at
the pure-strategy covered duopoly equilibrium established in proposition 1. Then, there
must be a critical value of T within the interval between T (C 2) and T (NC 2) below which
the outcome of the mixed-strategy equilibrium will be a covered duopoly, while above it
the market will be a non-covered duopoly. Finally, in the interval of T between the two
bounds of the consumer income distribution, a and b, the condition in (22) for having
at most two entrants will be violated. However, this does not imply that there will be
more entrants into the market because the latter cannot be covered when the lump-sum
tax exceeds the lowest consumer income. Hence, entrants should compete with the
non-taxable outside option, which cannot be beaten by any other quality than the best
one when the lump-sum tax is above T (NC 2). As a result, the equilibrium will again be
a non-covered monopoly as defined in proposition 3. Finally, for values of T above the
highest consumer income b, even the best quality will be unsalable so that the market will
not exist.
1.4 Conclusion
This paper explores the effect that the amount of an exogenous expense can have on
the structure and the coveredness of a market for vertically differentiated goods. The
exogenous expense is modeled as a lump-sum tax imposed on the incomes of the
consumers of the market good.
The results confirm the existence of the covered-duopoly market equilibrium
established by Shaked and Sutton (1982) when exogenous expenses are small and tending
to zero. At a greater exogenous expense, however, some low-income consumers prefer
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the outside option. That is, the equilibrium outcome is a non-covered duopoly. In turn, the
producer of the low-quality good is prone to divert from maximal product differentiation
to an internal solution for quality. However, when the amount of the exogenous expense
exceeds the incomes of all the consumers who prefer the low-quality good to the
high-quality good at the equilibrium prices, even the minimal product differentiation
and zero pricing cannot save the positive market share of the low-quality firm. Such
an exogenous expense is unaffordable for these consumers and therefore they choose the
outside option instead. Accordingly, a monopoly outcome prevails at equilibrium.
The suggested solutions indicate not only the effect of the lump-sum tax on the market
structure and product differentiation, but also on the market coveredness. A clear negative
relationship is identified between the size of the tax and the share of consumers being
served by the firms in the market.
The presented work also opens new perspectives for future research on the topic.
Specifically, one of the equilibrium outcomes suggests the existence of a potential for
a lump-sum tax to perform as a tool for social welfare improvement. This would be
the case, if, at a medium-sized lump-sum tax, the positive effect on the average quality
in the market which increases consumer surplus dominates the negative effect from the
parallel exclusion of the lowest-income consumers from the market. To be able to explore
further this issue, however, we need to modify the model in a way that allows for explicit
derivation of the optimal quality choice of the low-quality firm at the non-covered duopoly
equilibrium established in the paper.
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2 Why Mixed Qualities May Not Survive at Equilibrium:
The Case of Vertical Product Differentiation
This paper explores price competition in a vertically differentiated market where a
firm’s product is consumed not separately but in a fixed one-to-one ratio with another
complementary type of good supplied by a different producer in another vertically
differentiated market.
When there is only a single entrant in the one market, a monopoly outcome is shown
to prevail at equilibrium in the other market as well. The result holds for any number
of potential entrants in the second market. It is independent of the distribution of the
consumer tastes, provided that consumers value the monopoly good more. A further
necessary condition is that the best good in the adjacent market must be of a sufficiently
higher quality than any other good of its type (i.e. at least two and a quarter times better).
In a setting with more than two entrants in each of the two markets, certain conditions
on the quality choice of firms and the consumer taste distribution are identified, at which
a particular duopoly equilibrium exists in both markets. A key characteristic of this
equilibrium is that the optimal prices are such that the combinations consisting of both
high- and low-quality goods, which we call “mixed-quality combinations”, will remain
unsold. This equilibrium outcome represents a further form in which the well-known
maximum-differentiation principle could be implemented in a multi-market setting with
exogenous constraints imposed on firms’ quality choices.
Keywords: complementary goods, vertical product differentiation, market exclusion
JEL classification: L11, L13, L15
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2.1 Introduction
The principles that drive firms’ behavior in a single vertically differentiated
market are well-established in the existing industrial organization literature
(Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), Shaked and Sutton (1982), and Tirole (1988)).
Little is known, however, about the way these principles hold in a broader multi-market
environment. In the present paper, we make first steps in this direction by modeling two
adjacent vertically differentiated markets for final goods consumed as complements.
Adjacent vertically differentiated markets are not uncommon. There are many
examples of vertically differentiated goods that are complements to other goods which
are also vertically differentiated. In this particular case, consumers always purchase them
both in a fixed one-to-one ratio even though they are sold by different firms, in different
markets and at different prices. For instance, when buying a new flat or a house from
a real-estate company, consumers also often buy furniture from a home-furnishing shop
or cabinet-maker. When going on a business trip, employees should be provided not
only with transportation from an airline company but also with accommodation from a
hotel at their destination.1 Or, when buying a computer, a consumer actually pays for a
central-processing unit (CPU) manufactured by a computer hardware firm, screen from
a TV producer, an operation platform from a system software provider, and application
software from a number of application software developers.
One of the most interesting features of single vertically differentiated markets is the
1Note that transportation and accommodation are also demanded when going on a holiday trip, but the
two are mostly offered by holiday agencies in a pre-selected bundle. In our paper, however, we are interested
in studying only vertically differentiated markets where consumer choice is in no way pre-selected by
firms but represents an optimal consumers’ decision given firms’ optimal quality and price choices. For a
thorough discussion of the competition and welfare effects of the existing practices of firms to restrict free
consumer choice by providing them with pre-selected bundles of goods in the form of take-it-or-leave it
offers, see Whinston (1990), Carlton and Waldman (2002), and Nalebuff (2003a, 2003b).
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so-called maximum-differentiation principle that drives firms’ optimal quality choice.
Mussa and Rosen (1978) first show that an uninformed multi-product monopolist could
benefit from broadening the range of the quality spectrum of its product line, which
would allow it to imperfectly price discriminate between consumers who have different
tastes for quality and therefore heterogeneous willingness to pay for it. Since the
consumers with a low willingness to pay are inclined to compromise on quality, they
can be easily distinguished from the consumers with a high willingness to pay by
strategic deterioration of the lower edge in the quality spectrum offered by the monopolist.
Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) apply the same principle to a duopoly market with
single-product firms where consumers differ by income. They show that duopolists could
gain from differentiating the quality of their products, which leads to segmentation of
the market and raises the market power of each duopolist in its respective segment.
Maskin and Riley (1984) extend the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) for the case of
multiple-product monopolist facing non-unit consumption. Donnenfeld and White (1988)
introduce a discrete heterogeneity of consumers to show that a multi-product monopolist
would prefer to broaden the quality spectrum of its product line upwards when the
relationship between absolute and marginal willingness to pay for quality is allowed to be
negative. Champshur and Rochet (1989) consider the case of a multi-product duopoly
and prove that even though duopolists still prefer to broaden their quality spectrums
there will always be a gap between their product lines at equilibrium. The competition
relaxing effect of vertical product differentiation is further explored by Moorthy (1988),
Choi and Shin (1992) and Wauthy (1996).
In this paper, we propose a model of two adjacent vertically differentiated markets
to explore how the maximum-differentiation principle might drive outcomes in this new
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setting. We assume complementary goods are consumed in a fixed one-to-one proportion
and are supplied by single-product firms, while consumers are not restricted in their choice
of how to combine the available goods from the two markets. Particularly, the solution
of the model implies that a duopoly equilibrium exists at which firms choose not only
to maximize the differentiation between their products within each market but also to
charge prices at which the quality/price ratio of the less-differentiated combinations is not
optimal for any of the consumers. That is, only the most differentiated combinations that
consist of the two top-quality and the two bottom-quality goods will be sold, while the
remaining combinations which we call “mixed-quality combinations” will remain unsold.
In some vertically differentiated markets for complementary goods it is not uncommon
to observe self-selection bias in consumers’ choices so that only the combinations of
goods with similarly ranked qualities and prices are purchased by consumers while the
mixed-quality combinations are ignored. For instance, it would be very unusual to see
consumers who buy an expensive luxurious house and furnish it with cheap do-it-yourself
furniture. Or vice versa; normally consumers who buy small cheap flats do not equip
them with high-design expensive furniture. Likewise, businessmen who order business-jet
charter flights naturally choose to be accommodated in five-star hotels, which is not the
case of small-firm entrepreneurs or lower-level managers whose business-trip budget only
allows them to travel in the business or economy class on public airline flights. 2
One straightforward explanation for the observed self-selection choices of consumers
could be that the valuations for the both types of goods are identically distributed
among consumers so that the buyers of the high-quality good in one of the markets at
equilibrium will also choose the high-quality good in the other market, while the rest
purchase low-quality goods in both markets. Therefore, in the end, no-one finishes with a
2We are grateful to Michael Kunin for suggesting both the house-furniture and the flight-hotel examples.
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mixed-quality combination. However, this explanation is implied by the assumption that
consumers choose each of the complementary goods in its single market (Kováč 2007).
Given that two goods are complements, it is perhaps too strong an assumption to make
that consumers purchase them in single markets. This is our argument for why, in the
present paper, we follow a different approach by assuming instead that consumers do not
choose from the goods available in each market but from the one-to-one combinations that
can be formed out of the goods in both markets. In the setting with two duopoly markets,
there are four possible combinations of the two goods in each of the markets. The best
combination is apparently given by the pair of the higher-quality goods, while the worst
combination involves the lower-quality goods only. The remaining two mixed-quality
combinations are ranked second and third respectively, based on how substitutable the
qualities in one market are by the qualities in the other market, while determining the
qualities of the combinations in which they take part. To derive a determinable solution,
we also introduce an individual upper bound on the quality choice of each potential
entrant as well as a general lower bound on the quality choice of all firms in each market.
Intuitively, the upper constraint on the quality choice of the firms could be considered
a contemporary maximal technological frontier which varies across firms, whereas the
lower restriction may represent the minimal social (safety or hygienic) requirements for a
good to be acceptable for sale in a given market.
In the two-market setting that we suggest, each good participates in two of the possible
combinations and therefore by choosing the price of its good a firm is also affecting the
demand for the two possible combinations in which it takes part. If the combination of the
two high-quality goods and the combination of the two low-quality goods are the only two
combinations that have positive demand at equilibrium, this should not be only because
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maximum differentiation quality choices were made by the entrants in the both markets.
In addition, it must be the case that the high-quality producers find it suboptimal to set
prices low enough for their goods to be sold also in mixed-quality combinations with their
low-quality counterparts from the other market.
This new approach that we apply further allows us to identify how the characteristics of
the well-known single-market duopoly equilibrium changes in the context of a two-market
setting. The existing literature uses three key properties to characterize the equilibrium
duopoly outcome in a single vertically differentiated market. We take these properties as
a benchmark when analyzing the optimal solution of the two-market setting. Accordingly,
before presenting our results, we will discuss below the single-market properties as
initially described by Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983).
First, Shaked and Sutton (1982) explore a simple setting where firms have zero unit
production cost and consumer incomes follow a continuous uniform distribution, to
show the positive correlation between the market segmentation and the dispersion in
consumers’ incomes. This property follows straight from the definition of vertical product
differentiation, which states that, independent on how consumers differ by income, they
all unanimously rank the qualities of the available goods in the market. That is to say,
no matter how low is the income of a consumer, s/he will always value and be willing to
pay more for the top-ranked good than for the second-best ranked good. Similarly, her
(or his) valuation will be higher for the second-best ranked good than for the third-best
ranked good, and so on down the mutually agreed quality ranking of goods. The firm
offering the top quality, therefore, can efficiently drive all competitors out of the market.
For this purpose, it is sufficient to charge a price for its good that exceeds the valuation
of the lowest-income consumer for the second-best ranked good but is still below her
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(or his) reservation price for the top-quality good. Whether the top-quality firm will,
however, find it optimal to charge such an exclusionary price would depend on how low
the lowest consumer income is relative to the highest consumer income. The lower
the ratio between the two the more likely it would be for the market size to exceed
the profit-maximizing scale of the top-quality firm. Then, there will be more space for
further segmentation through accommodating the market entry of other lower-quality
firms. Shaked and Sutton (1982) prove that if, and only if, the lowest consumer income
is more than two times but at most four times smaller than the largest consumer income,
exactly two firms can have positive market shares at equilibrium.
Second, Shaked and Sutton (1982) demonstrate that the same condition that ensures
at most two market entrants is also sufficient for the market to be covered; that is, each
consumer will buy one or the other of the two available goods at the single duopoly
equilibrium. Moreover, the result does not depend on quality differentiation in the market.
Quality difference positively affects only the prices of the two entrants but not their market
shares.
Third, Shaked and Sutton (1983) derive a general condition for having the so-called
finiteness property of the vertically differentiated markets, even in the case of
positive unit production costs. As opposed to the classical (monopolistic competition)
outcome of the representative-consumer model of market differentiation described by
Chamberlin (1933), Shaked and Sutton (1983) state that when the entry barriers tend
to zero in a vertically differentiated market, the number of firms with positive market
share remains finite. For the finite upper bound on the number of entrants at equilibrium
to exist, the difference in the price markups of any two firms whose goods have
neighboring quality ranks should be larger than the difference in their unit production
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costs. Analogously to the case without production cost, the result again follows straight
from the definitional assumption that there is unanimous consensus among consumers
regarding how the available goods should be ranked by quality. Accordingly, since the
finite number of entrants is endogenously determined, Shaked and Sutton (1983) call the
corresponding market structure a “natural oligopoly”.
In our paper, we start by analyzing the solution for the case when the number
of entrants in one of the markets is exogenously restricted to one. For expositional
convenience we identify the consumers by taste as in the classical model of
Mussa and Rosen (1978). This does not affect the comparability of our results with
the respective results of Shaked and Sutton (1982), because, as shown by Tirole (1988),
richer consumers are also more demanding, so that consumers’ identification by taste
could be considered to be equivalent to that by income. Accordingly, we assume a
dispersion of consumer tastes which satisfies the condition on the consumer income
distribution, proven by Shaked and Sutton (1982) to be necessary and sufficient for
having a covered-duopoly outcome in a single-market setting. Our results, however,
suggest the existence of a unique non-covered monopoly equilibrium at the two-market
setting instead. This outcome is also surprising in the context of the literature on market
foreclosure (Whinston 1990). It implies that leveraging the market power from an
adjacent market with a lower level of competition might appear not as a consequence
but rather as a cause of market exclusion of competitors. The condition for blockading all
but the best-quality entrant in the adjacent market that is its quality choice upper bound
must be at least a nine-fourth of the upper bound on the quality choice of the entrant with
the second-best good.
We further show that the difference in the market power of firms between the two
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adjacent markets is decisive for the ranking of the mixed-quality combinations, given two
entrants in each market. Due to the positive relationship between quality differentiation
and the market power of firms, there is a clear dependence between the quality ranking
of the goods in the more differentiated of the two markets and the ranking of the
mixed-quality combinations in which these goods take part. That is, the mixed-quality
combination based on the higher-quality good in the more differentiated market has higher
rank than the mixed-quality combination based on the lower-quality good in the same
market. This is demonstrated for three different possible relations between the qualities
of any pair of available complementary goods with regard to how they define the quality
of the combination they form. Particularly, we consider linear (perfectly substitutable
qualities), multiplicative (non-perfectly substitutable qualities) and Leontief (perfectly
complementary qualities) functional relationships between the combined goods’ qualities.
Next, we analyze the solution for the case when the number of entrants in both markets
is exogenously restricted to two. Our results imply that, for having the mixed-quality
combinations unsalable at equilibrium, it is sufficient for the quality of the second-best
ranked combination to be at most equal to the median between the qualities of the best
and worst combinations. Then, the higher-quality firm in the more differentiated market
does not benefit from decreasing the price of good as low as is necessary to sell it as a part
of the second-best ranked combination; that is, together with the lower-quality good. We
further show that the condition for having this equilibrium outcome could not hold when
the qualities are linearly related, because the higher-quality good perfectly substitutes its
lower-quality counterpart in the second-best combination. The exclusionary outcome for
the mixed-quality combinations, however, is proven to be feasible at equilibrium in the
case of less substitutable (multiplicative and Leontief) relationships between the qualities
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of the combined complementary goods.
Additionally, we show that, distinct from the single-market solution, the dispersion of
consumer tastes, for which Shaked and Sutton (1982) prove a covered duopoly outcome,
is neither necessary nor sufficient for both markets to be covered at equilibrium in
the two-market setting. The reason is again the difference in quality differentiation
between the two markets. The lower-quality firm in the more differentiated market has
higher market power, which makes it less willing than its counterpart in the adjacent
market to decrease its price in order to cover the market. Therefore, the consumers
must be more demanding than at the single-market equilibrium to be still willing to
pay the higher optimal price of the lowest-quality combination, instead of giving it
up for an inferior free non-market option. Furthermore, the larger the differentiation
between the best and the worst combinations, the higher the lowest consumer taste for
quality should also be for the market to be covered at equilibrium. This implies that
quality differentiation of the combinations has a relaxation effect on the competition of
firms, which resembles the well-recognized competition relaxing effect of the product
differentiation in a single-market setting. Indeed, when firms can combine their goods
with complementary goods from another vertically differentiated market, this extends
their ability to gain market power through direct quality differentiation of their goods by
also allowing them to implicitly restrict the salability of their mixed-quality combinations
through exclusionary pricing.
Finally, we derive the conditions for effective deterrence of a potential third entrant
in any of the two markets. It is also not independent of the quality choice of the firms.
Specifically, the upper bound on the quality choice of the entrant needs to be at least
twice as small as the upper bound of the higher-quality firm in the market targeted by the
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entrant. Otherwise, the quality of the best combination involving the good of the third
entrant is so close to the quality of the worst combination of the incumbent goods that the
suppliers of the latter find it optimal to accommodate the entrant at equilibrium by setting
prices at which the lowest-income consumers buy the entrant’s good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model, section 2.3 presents
the particular solution for the proposed subgame-perfect equilibrium and establishes the
sufficient conditions for it to hold. Section 2.4 summarizes the results and provides brief
comments on their implications.
2.2 The Model
We start with the introduction of a stylized model of a market for combinations consisting
of two types of goods, each offered independently by a separate firm. The two types of
goods are denoted by A and B, respectively. Since goods are assumed to be consensually
ranked by quality, they can be identified by their rank starting from the best-quality good
being ranked at 1, the second-best at 2 and so on, as shown below:
f (A1)> f (A2)> .... > f (Am)> 0 (1)
where f (Ai) denotes the value that consumers assign to a mutually-agreed mix of
characteristics of the A type product, based on which it is ranked at i-th place, i = 1, ...,m;






denotes the value that consumers assign to a mutually-agreed mix of
characteristics of the B type product, based on which it is ranked at j-th place, j = 1, ...,n.
The assumption that the two types of goods are complements in quantities (i.e.
consumed in fixed one-to-one combinations) does not imply that they should also be
perfect complements in qualities.3 There are various ways in which the consumer
valuations of the two types of goods could interact in defining the qualities of the
combinations these goods form. Therefore, in our model the qualities of the combinations
AiB j, i = 1, ...,m, j = 1, ...,n that might be formed by any pair of the available
A and B-type goods are given as a function of the consumer valuations of these










)]ρ } 1ρ (3)
where:
χi j - the aggregate quality of the combination AiB j, i = 1, ...,m; j = 1, ...,n
ρ = 1− 1
σ
- a coefficient which is increasing in the elasticity of substitution σ
To reveal the impact of substitutability between the qualities of the two types of goods,
we compare the following three cases of interaction between the qualities:




when ρ → 1 i.e. the two goods are perfect
substitutes in qualities




when ρ → 0 i.e. the two goods
3We are grateful to Avner Shaked for pointing out this issue in his comments to an earlier draft of the
paper.
4We are grateful to Vahagn Jerbashian for suggesting the CES form of the quality aggregation function
for its property to encompass the full spectrum of possible qualitative substitutability between two
complementary goods.
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are non-perfect substitutes in qualities




} when ρ →−∞ i.e. the two goods are
perfect complements in qualities
In compliance with the classical approach of Mussa and Rosen (1978), we assume that









= θ χi j− pAi − pBj (4)
where:





= pAi + p
B
j - total consumer expenditure for the combination of goods Ai and B j
pAi = p [ f (Ai)] - price of good Ai as a function of its quality f (Ai), i = 1, ...,m
pBj = p[g(B j)] - price of good B j as a function of its quality g(B j), j = 1, ...,n
The demand side of the market is represented by a continuum of consumers who
make individual and mutually exclusive purchases (i.e. buy one combination or do not
buy any good at all) from all possible m · n combinations of the available goods of the
A and B types. We follow the approach of Mussa and Rosen (1978) to identify consumers





,0 < θ < θ . These simplification assumptions, common for models of
vertical product differentiation, imply that the demand for a good coincides with the
market share of its producer. Thus, they facilitate the representation of the solution of
the producer problem.
Like Kováč (2007), we assume that each consumer has the same taste for the quality
of both types of goods. Alternatively, it could be argued that the taste variable θ is
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type-specific. That is, a different support interval can be defined for each type of good.
Then, instead of modelling consumer valuation as a product of a type-irrelevant taste
variable with a quality aggregation function, a consumer valuation aggregating function,








)]ρ } 1ρ , could be directly proposed to replace the
minuend in (4). The adoption of such an approach5 would change the form rather than
the intuition behind our results in the sense that the conditions will be defined by means
of four {θ A,θ A,θ B,θ B} instead of only two {θ ,θ} consumer taste endpoint parameters.
Furthermore, there is a well-established proof in the literature that consumer taste could
be regarded as a measure of the inverse marginal rate of substitution between consumer
income and quality (see Tirole, 1988, p.96). Hence, the taste for the quality of a good
should be strictly positively correlated with the income of its consumer. Therefore,
given that consumer incomes do not vary across the products for which they are spent,
we find it reasonable to assume the same for consumer tastes. Finally, there is also a
technical argument for assumption of a type-irrelevant consumer taste variable. Namely,
the single-dimensional consumer taste space is preferable because it enables the direct
comparison of our equilibrium solution with that of the single-market case which we take
as a benchmark in our paper.
Together with the similarities, our model has also inevitable divergences from the
single-market models. The function in (4) includes two modifications of the original
function of Mussa and Rosen (1978), to make it applicable to our model of a vertically
differentiated market for combinations of complementary goods. The first modification
is prompted by the perfect complementarity of the goods being combined. It implies that
consumers could only enjoy combinations containing both types of goods in a one-to-one
5We are grateful to Eugen Kováč and Martin Peitz for pointing out the adoption of a multi-dimensional
consumer taste space as a less restrictive alternative to the approach we follow in this paper.
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ratio, but gain nothing from buying only a single good. We reflect this difference from
the single-market model in the utility function of (4) by replacing the single-good quality
parameter (χi) of Mussa and Rosen (1978) by the combination quality parameter χi j
defined by the function in (3). The second modification we make to the utility function
suggested by Mussa and Rosen (1978) is inspired by another trivial difference from the




which consumers incur when
purchasing given combination AiB j is not set by any particular firm alone, but is instead
given by the sum of the prices, pAi and p
B
j , set by the two firms supplying the goods
included in that combination.
To avoid implausible negative utilities, in the single-market models, consumers are
commonly assumed to have an outside option: not to buy any quality available in the
market, but to consume a free good of inferior non-negative quality. Here, for simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that the outside option is of zero quality. In
addition, since we do not have a single type of good but combinations of paired goods of
two different types we introduce positive lower bounds, F and G, on the quality choice of
firms producing goods of type A and type B, respectively:












The inequality conditions in (5) impose minimal quality requirements for a good of a
given type to be considered a market good. Accordingly, the minimal quality requirement
is the same for all producers of a particular type of good.
To establish the producers’ decision problem, we next need to derive the demand
functions that correspond to the consumer preferences expressed by the utility function
in (4). Particularly, note that in our model the market space is given by the support
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interval of the consumer taste distribution. Accordingly, the demand shares of the possible
combinations are represented by subintervals within the support interval, enclosed by
the so-called marginal taste variables. Each marginal taste variable, generally denoted
by θi j/i∗ j∗ , corresponds to a taste for quality at which a consumer would be indifferent
between buying combination AiB j or combination A∗i B
∗
j , where AiB j is of higher quality
than A∗i B
∗
j . For easier identification, from now on, we will call it marginal taste variable
of combinations A∗i B
∗
j and AiB j.
By making use of the utility functional form defined in (4), we could show that the
marginal taste variable is given by the ratio between the price difference and the quality
difference of the two combinations:
u
(




χi∗ j∗,θi j/i∗ j∗
)











for any i = 1, ...,m; j = 1, ...,n; i∗ = 1, ...,m; j∗ = 1, ...,n;
such that (i∗ 6= i) ∧ ( j∗ 6= j)
(6)
where:
θi j/i∗ j∗ – marginal taste variable of combinations A∗i B
∗
j and AiB j at which consumers
are indifferent between buying one or the other, given that χi∗ j∗ < χi j
Similarly, we could also derive the marginal taste θi j/0 at which a consumer would be








χ0 = 0,θi j/0
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θi j/0 – marginal taste variable of combination AiB j and the free outside option O at
which consumers are indifferent between buying the former and switching to the latter
As in the single-market case, when a marginal taste is within the range of variation of
consumer tastes, it plays the role of a boundary which divides the consumer population
into two groups. Or technically speaking, in our model, any marginal taste variable




divides the support interval into two subintervals
as shown in figure 1 below. One of the group consists of the consumers with tastes
lower than θi j/i∗ j∗. If asked at the given prices to choose only between the two
combinations, AiB j and Ai∗B j∗ , they will strictly prefer the latter to the former. Therefore,
we call the subinterval of the tastes of the consumers belonging to this group, the
lower-quality subinterval of θi j/i∗ j∗. On the contrary, the other group of consumers
with taste (variables)6 larger than θi j/i∗ j∗, will strictly prefer AiB j to Ai∗B j∗ . In turn,
we call the subinterval of the consumer taste variables belonging to this second group, the
higher-quality subinterval of θi j/i∗ j∗.
 
**/ jiij  
jiji BABA **  
    
** jiji BABA   
(lower-quality subinterval) (higher-quality subinterval) 




into the lower-quality and
upper-quality subintervals of θi j/i∗ j∗.
Alternatively, if the marginal taste does not belong to the range of variation of
consumer tastes, at the given prices all consumers will prefer either the one or the
other combination. Nobody will be indifferent. In technical terms, if a marginal taste
variable θi j/i∗ j∗ is smaller than the lower endpoint θ of the support interval, at the given
prices, its higher-quality subinterval will coincide with the support interval, whereas its
6Throughout the paper we use “consumer taste” as a brief form of “consumer taste variable”.
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lower-quality subinterval will be empty. Similarly, if a marginal taste variable θi j/i∗ j∗ is
larger than the upper endpoint θ of the support interval of consumer taste distribution,
at the given prices, its lower-quality subinterval will coincide with the support interval,
whereas its higher-quality subinterval will be empty.
In order to generally define the demand for any combination AiB j, i = 1, ...,m;
j = 1, ...,n, it is also useful to categorize its marginal taste variables based on whether
AiB j is demanded by their lower- or higher-quality intervals. The first category includes
the marginal taste variables in the indices of which the combination AiB j is positioned
after the slash. These are the marginal taste variables whose lower-quality subintervals
represent the consumers who at the given prices prefer AiB j to other higher-quality
combinations. Therefore, from now on we will refer to them as lower-quality marginal
taste variables of combination AiB j. In a similar manner, we will call higher-quality
marginal taste variables of AiB j the marginal taste variables in the indices of which the
combination AiB j is positioned before the slash. That is, the higher-quality subinterval of
each higher-quality marginal taste variable of AiB j represents the consumers who, at the
given prices, prefer AiB j to another lower-quality combination.
The demand for any combination AiB j, i = 1, ...,m; j = 1, ...,n, is given by the
intersection of all its higher- and lower-quality subintervals and the support interval of the
consumer taste distribution. In particular, it is equal to the difference between the smallest
higher-quality marginal taste variable θ i j and the largest lower-quality marginal taste
variable θ i j of any particular combination AiB j provided that the difference is positive.
Otherwise, if the difference is non-positive, the demand for the combination is zero:
Di j = max{(θ i j−θ i j), 0}, i = 1,2, ... ,m; j = 1,2, ... ,n; (8)
where for any i = 1,2, ... ,m and j = 1,2, ... ,n we have:
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θ i j – the smallest higher-quality marginal taste variable of combination AiB j,
i.e. θ i j = min
{
θψ(1)/i j, ... , θψ(ri j−1)/i j, θ
}
, so that:





– inverse rank-translating function which takes the quality rank of any
combination AiB j as an argument and returns the index i j formed by the ordered pair
of quality ranks of the goods Ai and B j of which the combination is formed, see table 1
below
θ i j – the largest lower-quality marginal taste variable of combination AiB j,
i.e. θ i j = max
{
θi j/ψ(ri j+1), ... , θi j/ψ(m·n), θi j/0, θ
}
Since the best-ranked combination A1B1 does not have a higher-quality marginal taste
variable (r11 = 1), the minuend of the difference term in its demand function is given by
the right endpoint θ of the support interval of the consumer taste distribution. Similarly,
if the smallest higher-quality marginal taste variable of a combination exceeds the right
endpoint θ , the latter replaces it as a minuend of the difference term in the demand
function of the combination. Also, if the largest low-quality marginal taste variable of
a combination is smaller than the left endpoint θ of the support interval of the consumer
taste distribution, the latter replaces it as a subtrahend of the difference term in the demand
function of the combination.
In the current paper, we explore two particular market settings. First, we define the
equilibrium in a market with single type A entrant (M = 1) that is assumed to have higher
quality than any of the N potential type B entrants ( f (A1)> g(B1)). Second, we solve
for an equilibrium where the mixed-quality combinations are effectively excluded from a
market with two actual type A and B entrants, respectively.
Below, we provide a graphical illustration of how the intersection of the higher- and
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lower-quality subintervals give the equilibrium demands for the best ranked combination
A1B1 in the first setting (Figure 2) and for the worst-ranked combination A2B2 in the
second setting (Figure 3).
The two equilibrium outcomes depicted in figure 2 and figure 3 represent two
mechanisms in which a combination might be efficiently excluded from the market. In
figure 2 we have an equilibrium outcome where the price of one of the goods which is
present in all the combinations is so high relative to the qualities of the goods excluded
that consumers prefer to switch to the free outside option rather than to buy any of these
low-ranked combinations. In figure 3, the qualities of the excluded combinations do
not differ sufficiently from the quality of the worst-ranked combination. Accordingly, at
the optimal prices that firms choose, the less-differentiated combinations are effectively
excluded in favor of the lower-quality, but more differentiated, worst-ranked combination.
Neither of the two exclusionary outcomes can occur at equilibrium in a single-market
setting.
There is also a third mechanism for excluding a good, which Shaked and Sutton (1982)
prove to be working in a single-good market. It requires the lowest consumer
identification variable, in our model θ , to be sufficiently low so that even when a good is
priced at zero, its lower-quality taste-variable is below θ . In the current paper, this third
mechanism plays a role in preventing the entry of a third type A and/or B firm. It enters
the solution by defining the necessary condition for having only two actual entrants in the
extended version of the second setting, allowing for more than two potential entrants of a
type. We do not provide graphical illustration of this outcome below because it does not
directly refer to the definition of the demand expression in (8).
In the first setting, since we have a single potential type A entrant whose good’s quality
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exceeds the quality of any other type B good, for any of the three special cases of the
aggregation function in (3), the ranking of possible combinations follows the ranking of
the type B goods, as shown in table 1 below:
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Then, as shown in figure 2 below, at equilibrium only two marginal taste variables, θ11/12






2111 BABA   1121 BABA   
3111 BABA   
NBABA 111   
11BA  11BA  
    
0/11  
11D  
Figure 2. Demand D11 for combination A1B1 defined by the intersection of
the subintervals of its marginal taste variables and the support interval of the
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consumer-taste distribution given a single potential entrant of type A and N potential
entrants of type B.
The value of the marginal taste variable θ11/0 is so high that it exceeds not only θ but
also the marginal taste variable θ11/12. As a result, there are consumers with tastes lower
than θ11/0 and higher than θ11/12 who prefer the free outside option to combination A1B1
and, by transitivity, to combination A1B2, as well. Accordingly, the consumers with tastes
lower than θ11/12 will also by transitivity prefer the outside option to A1B2. Thus, the
equilibrium outcome presented in figure 2 implies that all consumers prefer to buy either
the best combination A1B1 or the free outside option, which makes good B2 unsalable.
By induction we could show that this would be the case with any other B-type producer
whose good is not going to be ranked the best after entry. Therefore, at any positive spread
of consumer tastes, provided that there is a single entrant of type A, A1B1 will be the only
salable combination, with its demand given by the difference between θ and θ11/0. The
right endpoint θ of the support interval takes the place of the minimal higher-quality
marginal variable θi− j−/i j in (8) because A1B1 is the best-ranked combination and as
such cannot have a higher-quality marginal variable. Accordingly, θ11/0 is the largest
lower-quality marginal variable of A1B1 and as such it takes the place of the subtrahend
in the general demand function (8) for i = j = 1.
Such a market, where not all consumers are served by the incumbent firms, but in
which some low-taste consumers instead switch to the outside option, is said to be
not covered by those (incumbent) firms. Accordingly, the market coveredness and the
number of entrants with positive market shares are commonly recognized in the existing
literature as defining characteristics of the equilibrium outcome in any market with
product differentiation. Since in our setting we have only single-product firms, neither
of which alone is able to define the amount p(χi j) spent for any particular combination
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of goods AiB j, in what follows we prefer to talk not about firms, but about combinations
covering the market.
In the second setting that we consider, there are two actual entrants of each type
offering goods of distinct qualities, so there could be two different rankings of their
combinations as follows:
Table 2 Possible rankings of the combinations given two entrants of both types A and B





In figure 3 below, a particular equilibrium outcome is depicted for the case when ranking 1
holds.
 
    
22D  
2211 BABA   1122 BABA   
2221 BABA   
22/12  
2212 BABA   
22BA  
2122 BABA   
22/11  
1222 BABA   
0/22  
22/21  
Figure 3. Demand D22 for combination A2B2 defined by the intersection of
the subintervals of its marginal taste variables and the support interval of the
consumer-taste distribution given two entrants of each type, A and B.
As we will show in the next section, under certain conditions sufficient for having the
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equilibrium outcome in figure 3, the outcome is the same at the both rankings 1 and 2.
Namely, θ11/22 is of lower value than θ11/12 and θ11/21. Accordingly, there are consumers
with tastes larger than θ11/22 and smaller than θ11/12 and θ11/21 who at the equilibrium
prices prefer to buy A1B1 to A2B2, and A2B2 to A1B2 and A2B1, respectively. By
transitivity, this implies that all consumers with tastes larger than θ11/22 buy A1B1 but
not A1B2 or A2B1. By the same reasoning, all consumers with tastes smaller than θ11/22
buy A2B2 but not A1B2 or A2B1. Thus, only the best- and the worst-ranked combinations
are salable at equilibrium.
Based on the consumers’ demand for the possible combinations of the available goods
of each type, producers solve a decision problem which can be represented by the
following 3-stage game:
Stage 1: Firms simultaneously decide to enter the market or not.
There are M potential entrants of type A and N potential entrants of type B. There are
no multi-product firms. Accordingly, each entrant faces a different technological frontier
which is a restriction from above on the characteristics of the best good that it is capable
of producing. This is important for the entry decision of each potential entrant because,
upon entry, besides the other features the restriction from above will also constrain the
mutually-agreed mix of characteristics by which consumers value the type of good the
entrant offers. Therefore, in the model we introduce an individual upper bound on the
quality choice of each firm, which is already known by potential entrants before entry.
We will call this upper bound maximal quality constraint.
Since all consumers agree on the ranking of the characteristics of the goods of the
same type, ranking the potential entrants in descending order of their maximal quality
constraints should not vary among the consumers. Hence, the rank of the maximal quality
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constraint of a potential entrant is a unique identifier that allows us to distinguish it from
the others. Indeed, it represents the rank of the best potential product a firm could produce
in a kind of a virtual pre-market competition with the other potential entrants of the same
type. Thus, the rank of a potential entrant’s maximal quality constraint plays the same role
as a firm’s brand does in the real world. It sends a signal to the consumers (as well as to
the other external stakeholders of the potential entrant) about what is the best quality that
a firm can produce. Therefore, below we rank in descending order the maximal quality
constraints of the potential entrants of type A and B and denote them by F̄k, k = 1, ... ,M
and Ḡl, l = 1, ... ,N, respectively:
F̄1 > F̄2 > F̄3 > ... > F̄M (9)
Ḡ1 > Ḡ2 > Ḡ3 > ... > ḠN (10)
Stage 2: Entrants choose the qualities of their goods simultaneously.
Let m entrants of type A and n entrants of type B be in the market after the first
stage, m ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. We identify actual entrants in the same way as
the potential entrants. Each actual entrant of type A is associated with the rank i of its
maximal quality constraint F̄ki, i = 1, . . . ,m within the subsequence of sequence (9) which
is formed by arranging in descending order the maximal quality constraints of the actual
entrants of type A, as follows:
F̄k1 > F̄k2 > F̄k3 > ... > F̄km (11)
Similarly, each actual entrant of type B is associated with the rank j of its maximal quality
constraints Ḡl j , j = 1, ... ,n within the subsequence of sequence (10) which is formed by
arranging in descending order the maximal quality constraints of the actual entrants of
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type B, as follows:
Ḡl1 > Ḡl2 > Ḡl3 > ... > Ḡln (12)
To clarify the transition from potential entrants’ ranking to actual entrants’ ranking,
imagine a situation in which the first two best-ranked potential entrants of type A decide
not to enter in the first stage of the game but the third best-ranked potential entrant decides
to enter the market. Then, the third best-ranked potential entrant will in fact have the
best-ranked maximal quality constraint from all the actual type A market entrants, so that
in stage 2 its constraint from above will have rank 1, that is F̄k1 = F̄3. As we will show
later, this will never be the case at equilibrium. In fact, at equilibrium the m actual entrants
are the m best-ranked potential entrants. It cannot be optimal for either of them to stay
out of the market, given that at the same time market entry is an optimal choice for any
lower-ranked potential entrant. Similar examples and comments about the equilibrium
outcome after the entry stage can also be made for the type B entrants. That is, the
rankings in (11) and (12) characterize only the transition to the equilibrium outcome,
but not the equilibrium itself. The equilibria established in the next section are therefore
definable by solely using the notation for the maximal quality constraints of the potential
entrants in (9) and (10).
After observing how many firms of each type have entered the market in the first














. Entrants make their quality choices
simultaneously. The chosen qualities represent the same mix of characteristics of the
goods of each type on whose ranked value consumers are assumed to mutually agree
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according to (1) and (2).
Stage 3: Firms compete in prices.
After making their quality choices in the second stage, firms observe the available
qualities in the market and simultaneously choose the prices of their goods. Possibilities
for product extension mergers, collusions and tying practices imposing pre-selected
bundles on consumers are precluded in the model.
The payoffs of the firms are given by their profits. For simplicity, production costs
are assumed to be zero for all the producers of both types so that, for each firm, profit
coincides with revenue. The demand share of a good is given by the sum of the demand
shares of the combinations in which it takes part. Accordingly, dependent on the type
of its good, the decision of a market entrant at the first and second stage can be jointly


































Di j, j = 1, ...,n (14)
where:
ΠAi - profit of the producer of type A good with quality rank i
ΠBj - profit of the producer of type B good with quality rank j
RAi - revenue of the producer of type A good with quality rank i
RBj - revenue of the producer of type B good with quality rank j
DAi - demand share of type A good with quality rank i
DBj - demand share of type B good with quality rank j
If a firm decides not to enter the market in the first stage, its profit is zero.
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We solve the model first with exogenously set number of entrants. We start with
a model setting in which there is a single type A entrant and n potential type B
entrants. We assume that the consumer taste distribution satisfies the condition of
Shaked and Sutton (1982) for at least two entrants with positive market shares at a
single-market equilibrium. Our aim is to show that only the firm offering the best-ranked
type B good could still have positive market share at the equilibrium with only one
type A entrant. Then, we continue by analyzing a setting with two type A and two
type B entrants to define the conditions expressed in terms of the constraints on the
quality choices of the firms for having the mixed-quality combinations unsalable at a
covered-market equilibrium. Again the consumer taste distribution is assumed to satisfy
the single-market condition of Shaked and Sutton (1982) of exactly two entrants with
positive market shares. Finally, we define sufficient conditions of at most two entrants of
a type at equilibrium and show that these conditions are stricter than the single-market
conditions of Shaked and Sutton (1982). Under these more restrictive conditions, we
establish an equilibrium at which only the best and the worst combinations in the market
have positive market shares and cover the market. The results are formally presented and
discussed in the next section.
2.3 Equilibrium Solutions
In this section we discuss the results of the solutions of our model settings. Here we
present only the intuition behind the equilibrium outcome, while rigorous solution are
provided in the appendix. We are interested in exploring the conditions for having a
covered-duopoly market where only the best and worst combinations have positive market
shares. However, we reach it gradually.
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First, we establish the equilibrium solution for the case with only a single type A
entrant who faces higher maximal quality constraint than the n type B entrants.
Accordingly, for any of the three special cases of the aggregation function in (3), the
ranking of possible combinations follows the ranking of the type B goods as shown in the
previous section (table 1). We show that the variability of the consumer identification
variable (the taste variable in our model) should satisfy the same condition as in
Shaked and Sutton (1982) for having at most two type B entrants with positive market
shares. This is formally stated in proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1. Given that the number of type A entrants is restricted to one, let
the parametric endpoints θ and θ of the support interval, on which consumers’ tastes are




Then, of any n potential type B entrants at most two will have positive market share at
equilibrium.
Proof: see section A of the appendix
Distinct from the single-market equilibrium outcome, at certain conditions the optimal
solution of the particular case with a single entrant offering a complementary type A good
implies not two but only one type B entrant with positive market share. Furthermore,
the result is independent of the distribution of the taste variable. As shown in figure 2,
A1B1 is the only possible combination demanded by consumers at the optimal price
chosen by the single type A entrant. By being the sole type A entrant, the supplier
of good A1 is in a similar position to that of a classical monopolist. It maximizes its
revenue by setting a price at which only the consumers with elastic demand would buy
its good. However, when the best-ranked type B good is sufficiently differentiated from
the goods of the rest of the potential entrants, all the consumers with elastic demand buy
A1 only at equilibrium. That is, the taste at which consumer demand for A1B1 is exactly
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unit-elastic is actually the one at which consumers would be indifferent between buying
the best-ranked combination or switching to the outside option. Accordingly, if there
are consumers with lower tastes, they will strictly prefer the outside option. That is, the
market will not be covered at equilibrium. The result is established in proposition 2 below.
Proposition 2. Given that the number of potential type A entrants is restricted to one
and the maximal-quality constraints of the two-best-ranked type B goods are related as
follows:




of any n potential entrants of type B exactly one will have positive market share at
equilibrium. The result holds for any θ < θ̄ and for σ →{0,1}. Furthermore, the market





Proof: see section B of the appendix.
This situation resembles a standard case in the literature on applying product tying
as a market power leverage device where the producers of the two types of goods are
assumed to offer them in different markets. As a result, the firm operating as a monopolist
in one of the markets is in a position to decide whether to exclude the lower-quality
producer in the other duopoly market (Whinston, 1990, p. 841). Therefore, the monopoly
market is usually designated as core market, while the competitive market is designated
as adjacent market whereas the good sold on the core market is called bottleneck good
(Rey and Tirole, 2007, p. 2183). Since, in our setup, firms make decisions independently,
we could consider the type A entrant as operating in a separate market, let us call it
market A, from the market in which the type B entrants operate, let us call it market B.
Accordingly, good A1 plays the role of a bottleneck good. Distinct from the situation
7In a single-good model, condition (17) is sufficient for at least two goods of distinct qualities to
have positive market share. Together with condition (15), it ensures covered duopoly at equilibrium. See
(Shaked and Sutton, 1982, p.7).
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described in (Whinston, 1990), however, the market-power leverage outcome is achieved
in our solution without the entrant in core market A to have to tie its good to the good
produced by any of the potential adjacent market B entrants. Indeed, the consumers are
free to buy the bottleneck good A1 in combination with the good of any of the n type B
entrants. However, the consumers who value A1 sufficiently high to buy it at its monopoly
price, are too demanding to compromise with the quality of the best-ranked type B good,
which discourages the lower-ranked firms of type B from entering the market.
The result established in proposition 2 implies that the presence of a complementary
good of superior quality offered by a monopolist in market A might change the
equilibrium outcome in market B from a covered duopoly into a non-covered monopoly.
The condition for having such an outcome at equilibrium is that the best-ranked good in
market B must be sufficiently differentiated from the rest of the type B goods as required
by the second inequality in (16). Furthermore, in section B of the appendix we explore
the possible equilibrium solutions if the best-ranked type B good is not so differentiated.
We show that a non-covered equilibrium with more than one actual entrant in market B
cannot exist. The single entrant in market A will always apply exclusionary pricing,
given a non-covered market. An outcome with more than one entrant could occur only
at a covered-market equilibrium. Still, we could have at most three entrants, because






. Otherwise, the type A producer again prefers to charge
an exclusionary price for its good. Accordingly, for having exactly three entrants at





In the second setting for which we provide a solution of our model, there are two
potential type A entrants and two potential type B entrants. With this analysis, we move
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towards answering the key question in the present paper. Namely, we are interested
to define the conditions under which an equilibrium exists at which only the most
differentiated possible combinations of the available goods are actually sold.
In contrast to the first setting, here, there is no asymmetry between the two types
of goods in terms of the number of potential entrants that offer them. We have two
potential type A and two potential type B entrants. Therefore, the ranking of the possible
combinations cannot be deduced directly from the difference in the qualities of the
best-ranked goods only. Indeed, as shown in table 2 of the previous section, when there are
two potential entrants of each type, their goods have four possible combinations, for which
two possible rankings exist. For any of the three special cases of the aggregation function
in (3), combination A1B1 formed by the best goods of both types has the lowest rank 1,
whereas the combination A2B2 formed by the worst goods of both types has the highest
rank 4. The only uncertainty is which of the two mixed-quality combinations is better,
A1B2 or A2B1. The determinant of the preference relation between the two combinations is
given by the relation between the qualities of type A and type B. The particular condition,
however, depends on the elasticity of substitution σ between the qualities of the two types
which is present through the parameter ρ in the quality-accumulation function in (3).
The rigorous expressions of the conditions for each relation in the three special cases of
substitutability between the qualities of the two types of goods are presented in part C of
the appendix. Proposition 3 below establishes general sufficient conditions for ranking 1
in table 2 to hold at any of the three values which ρ is assumed to approach.
Proposition 3. Given two entrants of each type in the market and σ → {−∞,0,1},
the combinations formed by the better type A good would be of higher rank than the
combinations formed by the worse type A good if the following relation between the
qualities of the available goods holds:
f (A1)> g(B1)> g(B2)> f (A2) (18)
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Proof: see section C of the appendix
Since ranking 2 is a mirror image of ranking 1, a general sufficient condition for it




for i = j
in (18):
g(B1)> f (A1)> f (A2)> g(B2) (19)
The quality relations in (18) and (19) imply that the type of good with greater
differentiation is the one whose quality matters more for the ranking of the combinations.
That is, from the two mixed-quality combinations the one with the better-ranked good of
the more differentiated type is also of higher rank.
No matter which of the two mixed-quality combinations is of higher rank, we cannot
have both mixed-quality combinations salable at a covered-market equilibrium if the
quality difference between the combination with rank 2 and the best combination exceeds
the quality difference between the combination with rank 3 and the worst combination:
χ11−χ12 > χ21−χ22, if ranking 1 or,
χ11−χ21 > χ12−χ22, if ranking 2
(20)
When the condition in (20) holds, the denominator of the marginal taste variable of
the former pair of combinations is larger than that of the latter pair. At the same time,
the general expression in (7) implies that the two marginal taste variables have the same
numerator given by the difference of the prices of the goods of the less differentiated
type. Hence, the marginal taste variable of the higher-ranked pair of combinations is
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= θ12/22, if ranking 2
(21)
The inequalities in (21) imply that it is not possible for both the former marginal taste
variable θ11/12 (resp. θ11/21) to be larger and the latter marginal taste variable θ21/22
(resp. θ12/22) to be smaller than the marginal taste of the two mixed-quality combinations
θ12/21 (resp. θ21/12). There is either only one of the combinations salable at equilibrium
or neither of the two.
To understand the intuition behind the possible equilibrium outcomes when the
rank-related conditions in (20) hold, note that when the worst-ranked combination A2B2
is of sufficiently higher quality than the free outside option to cover the market, the rank 3
combination is the least differentiated from its neighbors by rank. Accordingly, the
suppliers of the goods in that combination are subjected to strong competitive pressure
to decrease their prices in order to make the combination salable. However, the firm
offering the lower-ranked good of the more differentiated type in the rank 3 combination
prefers to keep its price high because the sales of the worst combination, in which its
good is also present, are not threatened by the outside option. Similarly, the firm offering
the higher-ranked good of the less differentiated type is better-off selling its good to the
highest-taste consumers, who buy it as a part of the best-ranked combination. Indeed, the
resulting additional revenue compensates for the lost sales of the good as a part of the
mixed-quality rank 3 combination.
The competitive pressure experienced by the suppliers of the goods in the rank 2
combination is not as strong as that faced by the firms supplying the goods in the rank 3
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combination. On the one hand, the inequalities in (20) ensure that the differentiation of
the rank 2 combination from the best-ranked combination is larger than the differentiation
of the rank 3 combination from the worst-ranked combination. On the other hand, one of
the goods in the rank 2 combination takes part also in the worst-ranked combination A2B2
sold to the lowest-taste consumers. Therefore, its supplier should not necessarily lose
when the rank 2 combination has no demand. Indeed, the revenue from the worst-ranked
combination would compensate for the lost sales of the rank 2 combination if it is at least
as differentiated from the best-ranked combination than from the worst-ranked one:
χ11−χ12 > χ12−χ22, if ranking 1 or,
χ11−χ21 > χ21−χ22, if ranking 2
(22)
The condition in (22) is necessary and sufficient for both mixed-quality combinations
to be unsalable at a covered market equilibrium. To establish this equilibrium, however,
the condition on the combination qualities in (22) as well as the condition for a covered
market need to be translated into a condition on the constraints of the good quality choices
of the market entrants of each type. The result is formally presented in proposition 4
below.
Proposition 4. Given the distribution of consumer’s taste according to the conditions
in (15) and (17), let two firms of each type enter the market. Then, if whichever of the























for σ →{0,1} the following subgame equilibria exist in the last two stages:
1. at the quality-choice stage the maximum differentiation outcome prevails: see the
expressions in (D6) in the appendix
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2. at the pricing stage the optimal prices are given by the expressions in (D2) in the
appendix.
Proof: see section D the appendix.
There are three moments in proposition 4.
First, the condition in (22) for both mixed-quality combinations to be unsalable holds
only if the two goods are not perfectly substitutable in quality. That is, the negative
impact of the quality of the lower-ranked good on the aggregate quality of any of the
two mixed-quality combinations should not be perfectly compensable by the respective
positive effect of the quality of the higher-ranked good. Otherwise, the quality of the
rank 2 combination will be more similar to the quality of A1B1 than to the quality of A2B2.
So, there will be positive demand for the rank 2 combination at the equilibrium prices. In
the other two forms of the quality aggregation function we consider, namely, non-perfectly
substitutable (σ → 1) and perfectly complementary (σ → 0) qualities, for the condition
in (22) to be satisfied, the quality of the higher-ranked good of the less differentiated type
is sufficient to exceed that of the lower-ranked good by at least six-fifths.
Second, if there is demand only for the best-ranked and the worst-ranked combinations,
the optimal quality choice of the suppliers of each of the two types of goods is to
maximize the difference between their products. That is, the firm with the higher maximal
quality constraint of one of the types will choose that maximal quality for its good
whereas the other firm offering the same type of good will choose the minimal quality
constraint. Thus, by setting the range marked by the higher maximal quality constraint
and the minimal quality constraint of a type to be a subinterval of the range marked
by the corresponding quality constraints of the other type, the latter type will be more
differentiated at the equilibrium established in proposition 4. In addition, we require the
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higher maximal quality constraint of the less differentiated type to exceed the minimal
constraint by at least six-fifths to ensure the validity of the sufficient condition for (22) to
hold as discussed in the previous paragraph.
Third, as the equilibrium established in proposition 2 for the setting with a single
type A entrant, the equilibrium with two type A entrants and two type B entrants in
proposition 4 is defined for distribution of the consumer identification variable that
satisfies the conditions in (15) and (17). They are those proven by Shaked and Sutton
(1982) to be necessary and sufficient for exactly two entrants with positive market shares
to cover a single market at equilibrium. As discussed above, for the market to be covered
at this setting, the quality of the worst-ranked combination needs to be sufficiently greater
than the quality of the outside option, respectively not much smaller than the best-ranked
combination. This is ensured by the first left-hand inequality condition in (23) and (24),
respectively.
Finally, we establish the conditions for having exactly two entrants of a type at the
entry-stage subgame equilibrium at a setting where there are more than two potential
entrants. The key question is if two goods of each type could fit the market, whether
a third good of either of the two types cannot enter and have a positive market share at
equilibrium. In this sense, note that the optimal prices are negatively related to the number
of market entrants. The more entrants, the stronger the price competition between them
is. Therefore, if we can establish a condition at which the entry of just a third firm is
effectively deterred because it faces too low best-response prices from its competitors,
the condition will imply that these prices will be even lower in case of more than three
entrants. The effective deterrence of a third entrant again depends on the relations between
the qualities of the two types of goods and the corresponding ranking of the combinations
83
they form. The equilibrium at which a potential third entrant is effectively excluded from
the market is established in proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5. For σ → {0,1}, let the consumer taste distribution be characterized
by the following inequality condition:
4(χ11−χ22)
6χ11−χ22
θ̄ ≤ θ < 2θ̄
3
(25)
Then, if the quality-choice ranges of the three potential entrants with highest maximal
quality constraints satisfy whichever of the following alternative relations:
F̄1 > Ḡ1 > 2Ḡ3 > 2 max{F̄3,G}> 2 min{F̄3,G}> 2F (26)
Ḡ1 > F̄1 > 2F̄3 > 2 max{Ḡ3,F}> 2 min{Ḡ3,F}> 2G (27)
a subgame-perfect equilibrium exists, which is established by the solution of the
three-stage game below:
1. Only the two firms with the highest maximal quality constraints of each type enter
the market, the rest do not enter.
2. The optimal quality choices of the two entrants imply maximum product
differentiation (see the expressions in (D6) in the appendix)
3. The optimal prices are given by the expressions in (D2) in the appendix.
Proof: see section E of the appendix
The effective market exclusion of a third entrant of whichever type requires a wider




or (F̄1 > 2F) than is sufficient for having the subgame
equilibria with an exogenously set number of entrants in proposition 4. As a result, the
condition for a covered market in (25) is more relaxed than in (15) and stricter than in
(17). It restricts the lowest consumer taste from below instead of the higher maximal




In this paper we introduce a stylized model of price competition in two adjacent vertically
differentiated markets for complementary products manufactured and offered by different
firms. The setting analyzed here differs from the case considered in the classical literature
on vertical differentiation where goods are assumed to be offered independently in a
single market. By introducing vertical product differentiation in a multi-market setting
we also suggest an alternative market structure, natural (endogenous) duopoly, instead of
the classical (exogenous) duopoly structure commonly assumed in the existing literature
on adjacent markets.
We show that when the two types of goods combined are complements, consumed in
a fixed one-to-one ratio, the producers of the high-quality goods of each type might find
it optimal under certain conditions to charge prices at which the combinations they could
form with the low-quality goods of the other type are unsalable. As a result, if there is
only a single entrant in one of the markets, at equilibrium it would charge a price for its
good which makes all the combinations except the best one too expensive to be sold in the
other market, which thus becomes a monopoly. This monopoly outcome in the adjacent
market will prevail even if the distribution of consumer tastes satisfies the condition for
a covered-duopoly market in a single-market setting. Specifically, we assume that the
smallest consumer taste is more than two times but at most four times smaller than the
largest consumer taste. Furthermore, with this condition fulfilled, neither market will be
covered at equilibrium, which is to say that there will be at least one consumer who will
prefer the free outside (non-market) option to the only available top-quality combination.
In a setup with two entrants of each type, the producers of the type of good with the
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more differentiated qualities will have more market power. Again, as in the single-entrant
market setting, these producers might find it optimal under certain conditions to charge
prices at which the combinations formed by high-quality good of the one type and
low-quality good of the other type will not have positive market shares. Such an outcome
where these mixed-quality combinations are effectively driven out of the market could
occur at equilibrium only if the two types of goods are not perfect substitutes in qualities.
In addition, the differentiation between the high and low quality of one of the types should
be sufficiently larger than the differentiation between the high and low quality of the
other type of good for the quality of the second-best combination to exceed the median
between the best combination and the worst. The discrepancy between the two quality
differentiations should also be restricted from above for the market to be covered by the
worst-quality combination.
Further, we explore the conditions for having exactly two entrants of a type at
equilibrium, given free market entry for the both types of firms. We show that a stricter
condition on the consumer taste distribution must be imposed than that derived for the
single-market case. In particular, for the efficient foreclosure of a third entrant, the
upper bound on its quality choice needs to be exceeded at least twice by the upper
bound on the choice of the firm supplying the best-quality good of the same type. The
resulting market exclusion of the mixed-quality combinations provides a new explanation
of the self-selection bias in consumption observed in some industries where there are no
tying arrangements (e.g. business-trip transportation and accommodation, real-estate and
furniture, PC hardware and software).
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Appendix (Mathematical Proofs)
A. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of the sufficient condition for having at most two entrants of type B at
equilibrium follows the procedure suggested by Shaked and Sutton (1982). However,
here we apply it to the model setting with two types of complementary goods, single
entrant of type A and consumers identified by taste but not by income.
Suppose that all n entrants of type B in the market have positive market shares. The
respective profit-maximization problems that they solve at the pricing stage could be
derived from the expressions in (14) by substituting sequentially for the marginal tastes



















































































, if pBn > χ1nθ− pA1
(A1)
The corresponding first-order optimality conditions could be represented by the
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θ1n−1/1n −θ −
pBn
χ1n−1−χ1n = 0, if p
B






= 0, if pBn > χ1nθ− pA1
(A2)
The system of first-order optimality conditions in (A2) implies the following inequality
relations of the marginal taste variables at equilibrium:
θ > 2θ11/12 > 4θ12/13 > ... > 2
k−1
θ1k−1/1k > ... >

2n−1θ , if pBn ≤ χ1nθ− pA1
2n−1θ1n/0, if pBn > χ1nθ− pA1
(A3)
Hence, when condition (15) holds, we should have the following inequality fulfilled:
θ12/13 < θ (A4)
which implies zero market share for the entrants with quality rank larger than two.
Therefore, when condition (15) is satisfied at most two entrants of type B will enter the
market at equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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B. Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose one entrant of type A and n entrants of type B all with positive market shares.
The profit-maximization problem that the single entrant of type A solves at the pricing
stage could be derived from (13). As in appendix A above, we derive it by substituting
for the demand from (8) and for the marginal tastes from the expressions in (6) and (7)
























We first assume non-covered market at equilibrium to show that when such an
equilibrium exists there cannot be more than a single entrant with positive market share.











which implies non-covered market outcome only if (17) holds.
Furthermore, combining (B3) with (A3) yields the following result for the marginal
tastes at equilibrium:
θ1n/0 > θ11/12 > 2θ12/13 > ... > 2
k−2
θ1k−1/1k > ... > 2
n−1
θ1n−1/1n (B4)
which precludes the existence of a non-covered market equilibrium for n> 1. Exactly one
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entrant of type B could have positive market share if a non-covered equilibrium exists.
The condition in (17), however, is only necessary but not sufficient for the existence of
a non-covered equilibrium. The sufficient condition is the payoff of the entrant of type A
to be higher in case of non-covered market than in the case of covered market. So, now
we derive these payoffs explicitly.
Since the existence of a non-covered market equilibrium implies a single entrant in
market B, there is only one combination available, A1B1. Accordingly, the entrant in





































By substituting for the prices from (B6) in the expression for the higher-quality
marginal taste variable of combination A1B1 we show it to be given by a fixed two-thirds












Hence, the necessary condition in (17) for the non-covered assumption to hold at






Finally, we derive the payoff of the entrant of type A by substituting for the optimal








The existence of a covered-market equilibrium where all the n entrants of type B have







where pA∗∗1 stands for the optimal price of the good of the entrant of type A given the
market is covered by combination A1Bn while we denote by pB∗∗n the optimal price of the
good of the lowest-ranked actual entrant in market B.
We could re-write the inequality in (B10) by leaving only pA∗∗1 on the left-hand side:
pA∗∗1 ≤ θ χ1n− pB∗∗n (B11)
After setting the price of the lowest-ranked good of type B to be equal to the zero
production cost of its producer, the right-hand side of (B11) gives us the value of the
maximal price the entrant of type A could charge its good while still preserving the
coveredness of the market:
pA∗∗1 = θ χ1n (B12)
Since at a covered-market equilibrium, all consumers buy the good of the entrant of
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Comparing the expressions for the profit of the entrant of type A in (B9) and (B13)










Note that the fraction in front of χ11 on the right-hand side of the inequality in (B14)
















Hence, we could derive the lowest value this fraction could have by substituting for
θ = θ2 in (B14). Then, the condition for the profit of the entrant of type A to be larger at





Now for proving the result in proposition 2, it only remains to check for which of the
three cases of substitutability between the qualities of the two types of goods the condition
in (16) is sufficient for the inequality in (B16) to be satisfied.
Beforehand, however, note that since χ1n < χ11 by definition, the inequality in (B14)
would always hold as long as the numerator of the fraction in front of χ11 exceeds its
denominator. This implies that we could have covered-market equilibrium only if the
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θ ⇒ θ ≤ θ
7
(B17)
Then, the result in (A3) implies that when (B16) holds at most three entrants could
have positive market shares. Thus, since the inequality in (B16) is a necessary condition
for having a covered-market equilibrium, we cannot have more than three actual entrants
at such an equilibrium.
Below, we translate the sufficient condition in (B16) for having non-covered monopoly
equilibrium outcome in market B into a particular condition on the maximal-quality
constraints of the potential entrants for each of the three cases of substitutability between
the qualities of the two types of goods.
First, if the two types of goods are perfect substitutes in qualities (σ → ∞), the
inequality in (B16) takes the following form:




which can never be satisfied as long as the condition ( f (A1)> g(B1)) for having the
ranking of the combinations in table 1 holds.
Second, if the two types of goods are imperfect substitutes in qualities (σ = 1), the
inequality in (B16) takes the following form:




Third, if the two types of goods are perfect complements in qualities (σ → 0), the
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inequality in (B16) takes the following form:




The inequality conditions in (B19) and (B20) are trivially satisfied if the
condition in (16) holds. Hence, condition (16) is sufficient for having a monopoly
non-covered market outcome at equilibrium provided that the spread of consumer tastes
satisfies the necessary condition in (B8). When the latter condition does not hold(




, however, the result in (A3) implies that the market will be covered
by the best-ranked combination A1B1 at equilibrium. Therefore, condition (16) is
sufficient for having a monopoly market outcome independent on whether the necessary
condition in (16) is satisfied. That is, its weaker statement in (17) just ensures that the
monopoly outcome will occur at a non-covered market equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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C. Proof of Proposition 3
In this section of the appendix, we derive the conditions for the following inequality to
hold:
χ12 > χ21 (C1)
i.e. A1B2 to be preferred to A2B1, at all the three special cases of the quality aggregation
function.




- perfect substitutes (ρ → 1)
First, let’s suppose that the qualities of goods of type A and the goods of type B are
perfect substitutes. That is, the quality of any combination AiB j is given as a linear sum




Substituting for the combination qualities in (C1) yields the following result:
f (A1)+g(B2)> f (A2)+g(B1) (C2)
which after rearrangement takes the form below:
f (A1)− f (A2)> g(B1)−g(B2) (C3)
i.e. the difference between the qualities of the goods of type A should exceed the
difference between the qualities of the goods of type B.
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– non-perfect substitutes (ρ → 0)
Second, let’s assume that the goods of type A and the goods of type B are non-perfect
substitutes. That is, the qualities of the combinations that any pair of goods of
types A and B form are given by the product of their qualities (particular Cobb-Douglas




Substituting for the combination qualities in (C1) yields the following result:
f (A1)g(B2)> f (A2)g(B1) (C4)







i.e. the ratio between the high quality and the low quality of type A should exceed the
respective ratio of the qualities of the goods of type B.




– perfect complements (ρ →−∞)
Third, let’s assume that the goods of type A and the goods of type B are perfect
complements. That is, the qualities of the combinations that any pair of goods of
types A and B form are given by the smaller of their qualities (particular Leontief






Substituting for the combination qualities in (C1) yields the following result:
min[ f (A1) ,g(B2)]> min [ f (A2) ,g(B1)] (C6)
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which is equivalent to the following sufficient condition:
g(B2)> f (A2) (C7)
i.e. the low quality of type B should exceed the low quality of type A.
The quality ranking in (18) is sufficient for all the three conditions (C3), (C5) and (C7)
to be fulfilled. Hence, for having (C1) satisfied, it is sufficient the quality ranking in (18)
to hold. Q.E.D.
The corresponding combination rankings are represented graphically by iso-quality
curve mapping for each of the three cases on figure 4 below.
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 2Bg  
 1Bg  
 jBg  







 iAf   1Af   2Af
 
 2Bg  
 1Bg  






 1Af   2Af  
 2Bg  
 1Bg  
 jBg  
11  
12  
21  22  
Figure 4. Iso-quality curve maps of the combination quality ranking corresponding
to the good quality ranking in (18) for: (a) perfect substitutes, (b) non-perfect
substitutes, (c) perfect complements.
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For any given elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods, each iso-quality







with equal quality (rank). The more up and to the right an iso-quality curve is located,
the higher is the quality (rank) of the combinations formed by the pair values that belong
to the curve. As long as the values of the two qualities of type B lay in the interval
( f (A2) , f (A1)), qualities of type A are determinative for the ranks of the combinations
they form. That is, A1B2 is better than A2B1 (χ12 > χ21), at any of the three considered
cases of constant elasticity of substitution between the two types of goods.
Note that if we swap the values between the axes of any of the graphs on figure 4,
the two types of goods will trade their roles. The qualities of type B will become
determinative for the ranks of the combinations they form and A2B1 will be better than
A1B2 (χ21 > χ12).
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D. Proof of Proposition 4
Here, we derive the solutions for the subgame equilibria at the quality-choice and at the
pricing stages of the game, respectively as established in proposition 4. The equilibrium
solutions are derived by backward induction. Therefore, we start with the solution for the
pricing stage.
The number of entrants is exogenously set to two of each type. For now we assume
that the qualities of goods are related according to the condition in (18). Latter we will
show how the results change if the condition in (19) holds instead. The condition in (18)
implies that the combinations formed by the four entrants are ranked by quality according
to ranking 1 in table 2. We are interested in establishing an equilibrium at which only the
best-quality and worst-quality combinations, A1B1 and A2B2, have positive market shares
at equilibrium. At the equilibrium established in proposition 4 the market is covered,
i.e. θ22/0 < θ . All the assumptions together imply the following expressions for the


























































































The two high-quality producers of type A and B face identical problems. The same
holds true also for the low-quality producers of type A and B. Therefore, the solutions for
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Substituting for the prices back in the expressions for the profits yields the following






















Note that the condition in (17) is stricter than the necessary condition for A2B2 to have
positive market share:
D22 = θ11/22−θ =
2θ̄ −3θ
5




Both the expressions in (D3) are increasing in χ11 and decreasing in χ22. Also, for
any ρ both χ11 and χ22 are strictly non-decreasing in the qualities of the goods that
form them. Hence, the equilibrium solutions for the optimal qualities are given by
the upper-bound (maximal quality) constraints for the high-quality goods and by the
lower-bound constraints for the low-quality goods:
f ∗ (A1) = F̄m1; f
∗ (A2) = F
g∗ (B1) = Ḡn1;g
∗ (B2) = G
(D5)
Without loss of generality, we could assume that the two entrants of each type are
exactly the potential entrants with highest maximal quality constraints. Then, we could
mark the optimal quality choices above by the indices of the initial sequence of maximal
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quality constraints assigned at the entry stage:
f ∗ (A1) = F̄1; f ∗ (A2) = F
g∗ (B1) = Ḡ1;g∗ (B2) = G
(D6)
Accordingly, by substituting for the optimal quality choices from (D6) in
condition (18), it takes the following form:
F̄1 > Ḡ1 > G > F (D7)
The results so far are based on the assumption that only the best-quality and
worst-quality combinations, A1B1 and A2B2, have positive market shares at equilibrium.
To hold at equilibrium they should imply that the mixed-quality combinations, A1B2 and
A2B1, have no positive market shares at the prices expressed in (D2).
Note that the symmetric prices for the high-quality and low-quality goods of both types








However, when (D7) holds, A1B2 is strictly preferred to A2B1. Hence, nobody would
buy A2B1 at the optimal prices of the goods that form it.
Then, for the sales of A1B2 to be foreclosed, the following condition must hold:
D12 = θ11/12−θ12/22 ≤ 0 (D9)
Substituting for the optimal prices from (D2) in the expressions for θ11/12 and θ12/22
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Next, we need to check how this condition on the combination qualities translates into
corresponding condition on the good qualities for different values of the constant elasticity
of substitution σ . We consider again the three standard cases.




- perfect substitutes (ρ → 1)
When σ → ∞ i.e. ρ→ 1 and the quality accumulation function is linear, the inequality in
(D12) takes the following form:
f (A1)+g(B2)≤
f (A1)+g(B1)+ f (A2)+g(B2)
2
, σ → ∞ (D12)
which holds only when the inequality below is satisfied:
f (A1)− f (A2)≤ g(B1)−g(B2) (D13)
The condition in (D13) contradicts not only (18) but also (C3). Therefore, the sales of
combination A1B2 cannot be efficiently foreclosed if σ → ∞ and the two types of good
are perfect substitutes.




– non-perfect substitutes (ρ → 0)
When σ = 1 i.e. ρ → 0 and the quality accumulation function gives the combination
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quality as a product of the qualities of the goods that form it, the inequality in (D13) takes
the following form:
f (A1)g(B2)≤
f (A1)g(B1)+ f (A2)g(B2)
2
, σ = 1 (D14)











– perfect complements (ρ →−∞)
When σ = 0 i.e. ρ→−∞ and the quality accumulation function gives the combination
quality as equal to the smaller of the qualities of the goods that form it, the inequality in
(D11) takes the following form:
min [ f (A1) ,g(B2)]≤
min [ f (A1) ,g(B1)]+min [ f (A2) ,g(B2)]
2
, σ = 0 (D16)
which is consistent with the condition in (18) only if the following inequality holds:
g(B1)≥ 2g(B2)− f (A2) (D17)
Substituting for the optimal quality choices from (D6) in the conditions in
(D15) and (D17) yields the following inequality constraints that should hold for the








Ḡ1 ≥ 2G−F (D19)
Finally, we need to check the validity of the assumption for covered market at







which after substituting for the optimal prices from (D1) and (D2) takes the following










Below, we translate it into conditions on the qualities of the goods only for the case of
σ = 1 and σ = 0.
When σ = 1 i.e. ρ → 0 and the quality accumulation function gives the combination





, σ = 1 (D23)
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When σ = 0 i.e. ρ→−∞ and the quality accumulation function gives the combination
quality as equal to the smaller of the qualities of the goods that form it, the inequality in
(D22) takes the following form:
min [ f (A1) ,g(B1)]≤
3min [ f (A2) ,g(B2)]
2
, σ = 0 (D25)





Substituting for the optimal quality choices from (D6) in the conditions in
(D24) and (D26) yields the following inequality constraints that should hold for the










F , σ = 0 (D28)
Combining the conditions in (D18) and in (D27) gives the interval in which the
maximal quality constraint of B2 should lay in order when σ = 1 the conditions in (15)
and (17) to be sufficient for having a solution with exogenously set two entrants of each
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type so that the mixed-quality combinations have no positive market shares and the market










G, σ = 1 (D29)
which is feasible only if the differentiation between the goods of type A is limited as





The analogous condition for σ = 0 is given by combining the
conditions in (D19) and (D28):
2G−F ≤ Ḡ1 ≤
3
2
F , σ = 0 (D31)






The conditions in (D29) and (D30) are stricter than the conditions in (D31) and (D32).
To see that the inequality relations in (23) is sufficient for (D29) and (D30) to be












G > F̄1 (ensured by (23) together with (D33)) implies that both the
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constraint from above in (D29) and the inequality in (D30) hold.






Hence, having Ḡ1 > 65G which is ensured by (23) together with (D34) implies also that
the constraint from below in (D29) holds.
Since the condition in (23) ensures the validity of the conditions in (D29)–(D32) for
having covered market with excluded mixed-quality combinations at both σ = 0 and
σ = 1, we have all the assumptions for the subgame equilibrium solutions in (D2)
and (D6) to be fulfilled. That is, the condition in (23) is sufficient for having the solution
established in proposition 4. Q.E.D.
Since, the constraints in (19) imply having ranking 2 which is a mirror image of
ranking 1, the result in (24) could be derived directly from (23) by trading the respective
bounds of the qualities of type A and B.
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E. Proof of Proposition 5
The single-good conditions on consumer-taste distribution in (15) and (17) are only
sufficient but not necessary condition for the solution established in proposition 4.
Indeed, let’s assume the less strict condition in (D4) instead of the one in (17) for
having positive market share of A2B2. If we skip then the condition in (D22) so that θ is
limited by the stricter condition for covered market in (D21) instead of being constrained
by the restriction in (15), we will finish with having the condition in (25) at which still two
entrants of each type could make the same optimal pricing and quality choices. However,
since (D22) is not required to hold, we do not need to restrict from above Ḡ1 and F̄1 in
(D29) and (D30). Hence, the condition in (23) could be replaced by the following less
restrictive inequality relations between the bounds of the range of the quality choices8:
F̄1 > Ḡ1 > 2G > 2F (E1)
Correspondingly, the condition in (24) could be replaced by the following more relaxed
inequality relations:
Ḡ1 > F̄1 > 2F > 2G (E2)
The pairwaise comparison of the conditions in (15), (17) and (23) versus the conditions
in (25) and (E1) shows that there is a trade-off between the strictness of the conditions on
the consumer taste and the strictness of the conditions on the quality bounds for having an
efficient foreclosure of the mixed-quality combinations. To be consistent with the existing
literature on single-good markets for vertically differentiated products, in proposition 4
we gave preference to the conditions that restrict more the quality-choice bounds than to
8Note that the inequality in (E1) is stricter than the inequality in (D18).
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the ones that limit the consumer-taste distribution.
In proposition 5, however, we assume the condition in (25) because the inequalities in
(23) are too restrictive and do not comply with the requirements for having an efficient
foreclosure of the sales of an eventual third entrant in the market. The very requirements
are derived below to show that the conditions in (26) or (27) are sufficient to ensure only
two entrants of a type at equilibrium without violating the condition in (E1). We consider
only the cases of perfect complements and non-perfect substitutes, σ = 0 and σ = 1, since
the case of perfect substitutes σ → ∞ was proven to be inconsistent with the conditions
for having the mixed-quality combinations excluded from the market.
Suppose we have a third entrant of type A. Let’s denote it by A3. Combination A3B1 is
the highest-ranked combination that could be formed with A3. There are two possibilities.
A3B1 could be of better quality than A2B2 or of worse.
For A3B1 to be of better quality than A2B2, the following condition must hold:
χ31 > χ22 (E3)
When σ = 1 i.e. ρ → 0 and the quality accumulation function gives the combination
quality as a product of the qualities of the goods that form it, the inequality in (E3) takes
the following form:
f (A3)g(B1)> f (A2)g(B2) , σ = 1 (E4)
When σ = 0 i.e. ρ→−∞ and the quality accumulation function gives the combination
quality as equal to the smaller of the qualities of the goods that form it, the inequality
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in (E1) takes the following form:
min [ f (A3) ,g(B1)]> min [ f (A2) ,g(B2)] , σ = 0 (E5)
which is inconsistent with the condition in (18) for any f (A3) < f (A2). That is, we
cannot have A3B1 of better quality than A2B2 when the qualities of the two goods are
perfect complements.
Given that the conditions in (25), (E1) and (E4) are satisfied, the market share of A3B1
is given by the following expression:






1 − pA2 − pB2
χ31−χ22
(E6)
which after substituting for the optimal prices from (E2) takes the form:
D∗31 =
[





















When σ = 1 i.e. ρ → 0 and the quality accumulation function gives the combination





, σ = 1 (E11)
which holds for any f (A1) that satisfies the following inequality:
f (A1)> 2 f (A3) (E12)
Combining the conditions in (E4) and (E12) yields the following general condition for
efficient foreclosure of A3B1 when it is better than A2B2:




Note that if we have a third entrant of type B, the same logic would define the condition
for efficient foreclosure of A1B3 when it is better than A2B2 To derive the corresponding









Alternatively, when the condition in (E4) does not hold so that A3B1 is of worse quality
than A2B2, for efficient foreclosure of the sales of A3, it is sufficient to have the following
inequality satisfied:
θ > θ22/31 (E15)
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When σ = 1 i.e. ρ → 0 and the quality accumulation function gives the combination








, σ = 1 (E18)
When σ = 0 i.e. ρ→−∞ and the quality accumulation function gives the combination
quality as equal to the smaller of the qualities of the goods that form it, the inequality in







, σ = 0 (E19)
Both inequalities in (E18) and (E19) hold for any g(B1) that satisfies the following
inequality:
f (A1)> 2 f (A3) (E20)
Note that if we have a third entrant of type B, the same logic would define the condition
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for efficient foreclosure of B3 when A1B3 is of worse quality than A2B2. To derive the






The comparison between the inequality constraints in (E13) and (E20) implies that the
condition in (E20) is stricter and therefore sufficient for having the sales of A3 efficiently
foreclosed. Similarly, the condition in (E21) is sufficient for having the sales of B3
efficiently foreclosed.
Both the conditions in (E20) and in (E21), however, are satisfied as long as the maximal
quality constraints satisfy whichever of the following inequality relations:
F̄1 > Ḡ1 > 2Ḡ3 > 2F̄3 (E22)
Ḡ1 > F̄1 > 2F̄3 > 2Ḡ3 (E23)
Hence, both the conditions in (26) and in (27) ensure that at most two firms of a type
will enter the market at equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The inequality relations in (26) combine the conditions in (E1) and (E22) in the same
way as the conditions in (E2) and (E23) are combined in the inequality relations in
(27). Therefore, the inequality relations in (26) and (27) also ensure efficient foreclosure
of the mixed-quality combinations and covered market at equilibrium. The choice of
the relations between the maximal quality constraints Ḡ3 and F̄3 in (E22) and (E23)
is not occasional. Indeed, if there is a third entrant, the optimal quality choice of the
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second-ranked entrant of its type will be set so that it is not possible to be exceeded by
the quality choice of the third entrant. For example, if there is a third entrant of type A,
the optimal choice for A2 will be slightly above the maximal quality constraint of A3:
f ∗ (A2) = F̄3 + ε,ε > 0,ε → 0 (E24)
Similarly, if there is a third entrant of type B, the optimal choice for B2 will be slightly
above the maximal quality constraint of B3:
g∗ (B2) = Ḡ3 + ε,ε > 0,ε → 0 (E25)
Therefore, for the condition in (18) to be satisfied in case both A3 and B3 enter the
market at the first stage, Ḡ3 should exceed F̄3. Alternatively, F̄3 should exceed Ḡ3 for
the condition in (19) to be satisfied under the same circumstances.
116
3 The Role of Consumer Taste Variegation and Quality
Differentiation for the Entry Deterrence Effect of
Bundling in a Market for Systems
In this paper we explore three special cases of a market for vertically differentiated
systems to reveal the role of consumer taste variegation and system quality differences
for the entry deterrence effect of bundling in such a market. The results imply that
pure bundling and zero pricing cannot be effective entry-deterrence devices either against
a superior-quality entrant, or against an inferior-quality entrant, if the variegation of
consumer tastes is sufficient to ensure positive market shares for more than two systems
at equilibrium. An additional condition for any potential entrant to have a positive market
share is for the bottom-quality systems to be more differentiated than the top-quality
systems. Accordingly, an inferior-quality entry could be effectively deterred, only if there
is a restricted variegation of consumer tastes as well as less differentiated bottom-quality
systems. In the latter case, the effect of bundling on both producer and consumer surpluses
would be strictly negative.
Keywords: product tying, vertical differentiation, market foreclosure, system goods,
social welfare, anti-trust policy
JEL classification: L11, L13, L15
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3.1 Introduction
An important question in the competition policy debate is whether and when the decision
of a firm with significant market power in one market to enter another competitive
market should be legally restricted. Two main arguments are generally put forward
why such behavior might not be socially acceptable. On the one hand, the firm could
cross-subsidize its production in the competitive market by using the abnormal profit
it makes in the monopoly market to cover its loss from undercutting the prices of
its competitors (Faulhaber (1975), Berg and Weisman (1991), Boldon et al. (2000),
Eckert and West (2003), Chen and Rey (2013)). On the other hand, if the products traded
on the two markets are complements, the firm could make the purchase of its good in
the less competitive (aka “core”) market conditional on the purchase of its good in the
more competitive (aka “adjacent”) market (Whinston (1990), Nalebuff (2004), Carlton
and Waldman (2002), Kováč (2007)). In both cases, the outcome could be a leverage of
the market power of the firm in the core market to the adjacent market. The compelling
question that economists try to answer is at what conditions the leverage outcome would
occur at equilibrium.
In the current paper, we explore a model of a market for vertically differentiated
systems consisting of two goods. Consumers buy systems but the competition between
firms is good-specific and therefore takes place in two (core and adjacent) sub-markets,
respectively. The main objective is to examine the importance of the consumer taste
variability and quality differentiation of systems for the occurrence of entry-deterrence
(i.e. monopoly) outcome in the sub-markets at equilibrium.
In the existing literature the focus is set on the product bundling strategies that the
118
multi-product firm could implement to strengthen the price competition with a (potential)
rival. The rival is forced to decrease its price, which lowers its profit and ultimately turns
it into a loss. The result could then be a market exit (entry deterrence) of the entrant at
equilibrium. In his seminal paper, Whinston (1990) describes two bundling strategies that
could effectively deter the entry of a potential competitor. First, the multi-product firm
could commit to offering its products only in a bundle (pure bundling strategy) which
impedes its sales in the competitive market, leaving it with no other choice than to charge
low prices and thus be a tougher competitor in case of an entry. This strategy makes sense
only in a dynamic (two-period) market setting. Second, when consumers differ in their
valuation for the monopoly-market good, the multi-product firm could effectively deter
entry without precommitment, but by credibly threatening to sell its core-market good
both as a separate good and in an underpriced bundle with its adjacent-market good. The
offer of a bundle, together with one of the two bundled goods sold also as a separate good,
is considered by Nalebuff (2003) to be a special case of mixed bundling where the good
that is available separately is called a ”tying good”, and the good that is offered only in
a bundle is called a ”tied good”. Kováč (2007) compares the two bundling arrangements
in the setting of the standard static (one-period) model of vertical product differentiation
of Shaked and Sutton (1982), especially adjusted to represent a market for system goods.
He shows that the mixed bundling strategy with a tying good in the core market and
a tied good in the adjacent market is dominant for the multi-product incumbent firm.
Furthermore, it has the potential to effectively deter an entry of a potential inferior-quality
rival in the core market without precommitment even if it faces a superior-quality rival in
the adjacent market.
The results of both Whinston (1990) and Kováč (2007) imply that a mixed-bundling
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strategy is the optimal choice of the multi-product firm whether or not it results in
effective entry-deterrence. Indeed, mixed bundling is a profit-maximizing strategy,
not because of its exclusionary effect but because it allows for second-degree price
discrimination between the consumers who value the tying good highly and lowly,
respectively. Furthermore, in the setting of Kováč (2007) the duopoly outcome in the
case of no bundling follows from the finiteness property1 of the vertically differentiated
markets whereas in Whinston (1990) it is a result from the assumed increasing returns
to scale in the adjacent market. Therefore, Kovac’s (2007) condition for effective
entry-deterrence imposes additional requirements not only on the relations between the
quality choices of the firms in both markets but also on the range within which consumer
tastes could vary. For having the market only covered by the systems in which the
elements of the multi-product firm take part, that is all consumers buying only these
systems, their tastes need to vary in a certain narrow range analogous to the one defined
by Shaked and Sutton (1982) for a covered-market duopoly.2 The consumer taste
variation requirement of Shaked and Sutton (1982), however, is derived for the case of a
single-product vertical differentiation. Accordingly, in order to be able to adopt it Kovac
(2007) makes the assumption that if bundling is not implemented by the multi-product
firm (non-bundling strategy), consumers would buy the two goods forming a system at
two independent single-product markets. For brevity, from now on we will refer to this
assumption by calling it a “non-bundling independence assumption”.
In this paper, we relax the non-bundling independence assumption of Kováč (2007)
1In contrast to the free-entry outcome in markets with monopolistically competitive structure
(Chamberlin (1933)), when the entry barriers tend to zero on a vertically differentiated market, the number
of firms with positive market share remains finite at equilibrium. (Shaked and Sutton (1983))
2Shaked and Sutton (1982) show that given uniform distribution of the consumer identification variable
(income or taste) with support whose right endpoint is at most four times but not less than twice as large
as its left endpoint, this is a necessary and sufficient condition for having exactly two firms with positive
market share at equilibrium in a vertically differentiated market.
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and explore a static model of a vertically differentiated market where consumers choose
systems but not independent goods. As in Kováč (2007) we allow for a potential
inferior-quality entrant in the core sub-market and a potential superior-quality entrant in
the adjacent sub-market. For the particular market setting we show that the non-bundling
equilibrium outcome established by Kováč (2007) under the non-bundling independence
assumption could occur also in a vertically differentiated market for systems under certain
conditions on consumer taste variability and system quality differentiation, which we
derive explicitly in this paper.
Another key novelty in our approach is that we allow consumers who buy the
bundled system to upgrade it with the good of the superior-quality entrant in the adjacent
sub-market. This seemingly contradicts the requirement imposed by Whinston (1990) for
pure bundling to have an exclusionary outcome. Namely, the multi-product firm should
precommit to pure bundling. However, note that precommitment to pure bundling implies
only that consumers find it technically impossible or prohibitively expensive to unbundle
the multi-product firm’s system, but not that they cannot combine it with other system
elements. We refer to the latter assumption by calling it “assumption for irreversibility
of bundling”. Both Choi and Stefanadis (2001), as well as Carlton and Waldman (2002),
apply it in the context of the US v. Microsoft antitrust case3 by assuming that consumers
are not allowed to use more than one browser application on the same operating system.
However, Carlton and Waldman (2002) acknowledge that the integration of Internet
Explorer as an embedded application of Windows 95 did not satisfy the assumption for
irreversibility of bundling since consumers were still able to install and use Netscape
3In the late 1990s, the US Department of Justice had charges against Microsoft for violating the anti-trust
law by tying its browser Internet Explorer to its operating system Windows. For detailed description and
analysis of the US v. Microsoft antitrust case, see Economides (2001). For analysis of the close anti-trust
cases against Microsoft in Europe, see Economides and Lianos (2009).
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Navigator on Windows 95. Therefore, we find it reasonable to relax the irreversibility
assumption and study the conditions for the exclusionary effect of pure bundling when a
system upgrade is possible.
We propose three special settings of a market for vertically differentiated systems
where a multi-product firm could implement pure bundling that allows for a system
upgrade. The results bring out consumer taste variability and quality differentiation as
decisive determinants of whether there could be an exclusionary outcome at equilibrium
with or without the implementation of bundling.
In setting 1, we consider a simple case where the multi-product firm faces no threat
of entry in one of the sub-markets and a potential superior-quality entrant in the other
(adjacent) sub-market. The situation resembles the one modeled by Whinston (1990).
The only difference is that instead of offering the monopoly good as a tying good that
could be combined with the entrant’s good, the multi-product firm makes the upgrade
of the bundled system with the higher-quality good of its potential rival in the adjacent
sub-market possible. The results imply that at equilibrium all the consumers that buy
the bundled system choose to upgrade it. The multi-product firm and the potential
entrant have identical profits at equilibrium with or without bundling. The market
share of the multi-product firm in the core sub-market and that of the entrant in the
adjacent sub-market stay the same. The only change that pure bundling causes is in
the market share of the multi-product firm in the adjacent sub-market. It is zero at the
non-bundling equilibrium but strictly positive at the bundling equilibrium. Therefore, if
the multi-product firm implements bundling in such a market setting, this must be driven
by an impetus to save its sales in the adjacent sub-market rather than by entry-deterrence
or strategic foreclosure incentives.
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In setting 2, we study the case suggested by Kováč (2007) where the multi-product
firm faces an inferior-quality entrant in the core sub-market and a superior-quality
entrant in the adjacent sub-market. However, we relax the non-bundling independence
assumption, which allows us to establish a new non-bundling equilibrium where all the
four possible systems are demanded by consumers. We derive certain conditions which
presume sufficiently wide variability of consumer tastes and small differentiation of the
higher-quality systems for the non-bundling equilibrium to exist. Except for having more
systems with a positive market share at equilibrium, the non-bundling equilibrium results
also imply a zero corner solution for the price of the multi-product firm’s inferior-quality
product sold in the adjacent market. The reason is that the goods of a type sold in the
same sub-market are complements in prices, while the goods of different types that form
systems are substitutes in prices. This allows the multi-product firm to maximize the
surplus extracted from consumers in the core market by pricing its inferior-quality good
at zero in the adjacent market. However, in the particular setting at which we show zero
pricing to be optimal, it does not lead to effective entry-deterrence of any of the two
potential rivals at equilibrium. If seen in the context of the US v. Microsoft antitrust case,
the latter result complies with Davis and Murphy (2000) who argue that since the demand
for the browser of Microsoft is ”lower” (i.e. more price sensitive) than the demand for its
operating system, it is reasonable to expect Internet Explorer to be offered cheaper and
even for free when this is feasible. The zero-pricing outcome is particularly consistent
with the observation that “. . . many if not most markets with network externalities are
characterized by the presence of two distinct sides whose ultimate benefit stems from
interacting through a common platform” (Rochet and Tirole (2003), p.990).4 For instance,
4We thank Volker Nocke for pointing out to us this possible interpretation of the results of our model in
the context of the literature on the multi-sided markets.
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software application developers might prefer to offer their products for free to the end
users in exchange for sponsorship from the operating system (computing platform)5
developers who are thus able to obtain a larger portion of the consumer surplus in the
platform market.
In addition, our results for the bundling equilibrium solution suggest that pure bundling
cannot be an effective entry-deterrence device in setting 2 (i.e. with a wide spread of
consumer tastes and small differentiation of the higher-quality systems). In compliance
with Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Carlton and Waldman (2002), we show that pure
bundling lowers the market shares and the profits of both the superior-quality and
inferior-quality entrants. Yet, they are strictly positive because there are consumers with
low enough tastes so that only the providers of the inferior-quality good have an interest
in serving them.
In setting 3, again the multi-product firm faces an inferior-quality entrant in the core
sub-market and a superior-quality entrant in the adjacent sub-market. However, the
conditions on consumer taste variability and system quality differentiation differ from
these in setting 2 so that not all systems have demand at a non-bundling equilibrium and
not all potential entrants save their positive market shares at a pure-bundling equilibrium.
The results resemble the equilibrium outcomes in Kováč (2007). At a non-tying
equilibrium all firms make positive sales so that there is duopoly in both sub-markets
but consumers buy only the best and the worst possible combinations. At pure-bundling
equilibrium the inferior-quality single-good entrant is efficiently excluded from the core
sub-market. The comparison of the results with those from the solution of setting 2 imply
that consumer taste diversification and quality differentiation of systems are the main
5For a detailed discussion on the economic role of operating systems in computer-based industries, see
Bresnahan (2001), Evans et al. (2005).
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determinants of whether pure bundling is an effective entry-deterrence device against
an inferior-quality supplier. Less differentiated systems, together with the systems of
lowest quality in markets with less variegated consumer tastes, are the ones that remain
unsold at a pure-bundling equilibrium. Hence, having pure bundling implemented is only
a necessary but not sufficient condition for effective entry deterrence.
We also provide an analysis of the social welfare effect of pure bundling in setting 3. It
indicates a strictly negative social welfare effect of pure bundling. When consumer tastes
do not vary within a wide range, pure bundling lowers the market share of the upgraded
bundled system, which leads to a decrease in both producer surplus and consumer
surplus. The result is stronger than in the welfare analyses based on the models of
Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Kováč (2007) which imply uncertain welfare effects
of tying.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the supply side (3.2.1) and
the demand side (3.2.2) of the model. In Section 3.3 the solution of the model for the three




We consider a market for systems consisting of two types of goods, type A and type B,
respectively. The type A goods are sold in sub-market A, whereas the type B goods are
sold in sub-market B.
3.2.1 Supply side
Accordingly, we assume the following potential entrants in the market:
1. a (multi-product) firm M which reckons upon entering the both sub-markets.
2. two single-product firms, firm A and firm B, potential entrants in sub-market A and
sub-market B, respectively.
The strategic interaction between firms is modeled as a three-stage game.
Stage 1: Firms make simultaneous decisions whether to enter the market. Firm M
chooses also whether to enter both sub-markets, or only one.
Stage 2: Firm M observes the actual entries in the two sub-markets at the first stage
and decides to offer its goods in a bundle only or to sell them separately.
Stage 3: After observing Firm M’s decision at the second stage, firms compete
simultaneously on prices.
As is common in bundling models, the qualities of the products offered by the firms are
assumed to be exogenously determined (Whinston (1990), Carlton and Waldman (2002)).
So, we do not need to define explicit functional form to describe the relationship between
good qualities and the qualities of the systems they form.
There are four systems that might be formed from the goods which the three firms
could offer. Without loss of generality, we assume that the quality of the type-A good are
126
decisive for the quality of the system so that the systems based on the better type A good
(A1B1, A1B2) are of strictly higher quality than the systems based on the worse type A
good (A2B1, A2B2). Accordingly, in the case of duopoly in both markets, sub-market A
will be less competitive than sub-market B. So, to conform with the commonly agreed
definitions, we will also call sub-market A a core sub-market and sub-market B an
adjacent sub-market.
In addition, as in Kováč (2007), on the one hand, we assume that in the core-market
firm A offers a good, denoted by A2, which is of strictly worse quality than the good of
firm M, denoted by A1. On the other hand, in the adjacent market firm B is assumed to
offer a good, denoted by B1, which is of strictly better quality than the good of firm M,
denoted by B2. The letter in the notations of goods represents their type, while the
number – their rank if ranked in decreasing order of their qualities. Accordingly, the four
possible systems are denoted by AiB j, i = 1,2; j = 1,2; where i represents the quality
rank of good Ai and j – the quality rank of good B j. The corresponding ranking of the
systems in decreasing order of their qualities is given in table 1 below:






The system A1B1 formed by the best type A good, A1, and the best good of type B,
B1, is trivially also the best out of the four systems and therefore has a quality of rank 1.
Similarly, system A2B2 formed by the worst type A good, A2, and the worst type B good,
B2, is trivially also the worst out of the four systems and therefore has a quality rank of 4.
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Accordingly, as it was assumed above, system A1B2 based on the better type A good, A1,
is of strictly higher quality (χ12 > χ21) than the system A2B1 which is based on the worse
type A good, A2. Therefore, in table 1 the former system is of lower rank 2 than the rank
3 of the latter system.
We make another standard assumption for the models of vertical product
differentiation. Namely, that firms do not incur entry costs. That is, as long as a
firm can make positive sales, it enters the market (Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983),
Kováč (2007)). This assumption might look too restrictive to be attributable to markets
like the ones for software systems where product development usually requires significant
initial investment. At the same time, however, it is quite common practice nowadays
for the development of operating systems or software applications to be financially and
organizationally supported by non-profit organizations6 based on free public license
agreements with independent open-source developers7. Thus, the suppliers of these
software products incur zero entry costs.
For simplicity, production cost is also assumed to be zero which might be argued
to reflect the large economies of scale characterizing for example software production
again. Indeed, it should not come as a surprise to anyone who has ever downloaded an
application to a computer or smart phone that the marginal cost of the multiplication of
a copy of an installation program is negligibly small and tends to zero as the number
of copies increases. So, the profits of the entrants in our model coincide with their
total revenues. Hence, the pricing subgame equilibrium is given by the solutions of the
6In 2006 Netscape open-sourced their browser code, and entrusted it to the newly formed
non-profit Mozilla Foundation. The support for Netscape Navigator was ended and Mozilla Firefox
was officially released as its free open-source successor. For more details see the Mozilla Public
License uploaded at https://www.mozilla.org/MPL/NPL/1.1/ Similarly, a great deal of the Linux
distributions are supported by the Free Software Foundation (FSF). The complete list is available at
http://www.gnu.org/distros/free-distros.html
7For comprehensive discussion of the literature studying the incentives of developers and profit-oriented
software suppliers to take part in open-source projects, see Rossi and Bonaccorsi (2006)
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revenue-maximization problems of these of the three firms that decide to enter the market
at the first stage. The revenue-maximization problems of the three firms could respectively













Di2, if A1 and B2 are sold separately
Max
pM

















RM, RB, RA - the total revenues of firms M, B and A, respectively
pA1, pA2, pB1, pB2, pM - the prices of goods A1, A2, B1, B2, and bundle A1B2,
respectively; pAi ≥ 0, pB j ≥ 0, pM ≥ 0, i = 1,2; j = 1,2
DA1, DA2, DB1, DB2 - the demands for goods A1, A2, B1, B2, respectively
Di j - demand for system consisting of good Ai and good Bj, i = 1,2, j = 1,2
The market shares of the systems are determined by consumers whose preferences and
identification characteristics are described in subsection 3.2.2 below.
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3.2.2 Demand side
As is common for the existing models of vertical product differentiation, we assume that
the demand side of the market is represented by a continuum of consumers. Particularly,
we adopt the approach of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and assume that consumers are
characterized by their taste for quality θ which is a random variable following continuous
uniform distribution with support given by the interval [θ ,θ ], θ > 0.
Consumers do not gain from buying just a type A or B product. They need to have
at least a system consisting of a pair of goods of each type to be able to gain a positive
benefit from any of these goods. Therefore, consumers either buy a system or do not buy
in the market at all.
The utility function, in compliance with Mussa and Rosen (1978), is designed to
measure the individual surplus of any given consumer with taste θ from the purchase
of one of the four systems AiB j:
Ui j = χi j ·θ − pi j, i = 1,2; j = 1,2 (4)
where:
Ui j - reduced-form utility function of consumer with taste θ from purchasing
system AiB j
χi j – quality of system AiB j
pi j – price of system AiB j; if good Ai and good Bj are sold separately, the system price
is given as a pure sum of the goods’ prices, pi j = pAi + pB j
Consumer valuation of a system is given by the product of consumer taste and the
quality of the system. This assumption ensures the main distinct property of the markets
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with vertical product differentiation. Namely, consumer valuation increases in taste but
ranking of systems is consensually agreed by all consumers and remains the same across
tastes (Mussa and Rosen (1978), Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983)). To preclude negative
values of the utility function in (4), we make another standard assumption that consumers
have a free outside option with quality χ0 which they could choose instead of buying the
systems available on the market. The quality of the free outside option is accordingly
chosen to be strictly smaller than the quality of the worst system A2B2, i.e. χ0 < χ22.
Distinct from the existing bundling models (Whinston (1990),
Carlton and Waldman (2002), Kováč (2007)), we also relax the assumption for
irreversibility of bundling, allowing consumers to combine a type A good with more than
one type B good. Thus, we enable our model to better represent the market situation
in the US v. Microsoft antitrust case where consumers could install and use more than
one browser on their operating systems. Without loss of generality, the valuation of the
upgraded system is assumed to be given by the valuation of the highest-quality system
that could be formed by its goods. That is, there are no synergy effects from the upgrade.
For example, if a consumer decides to upgrade firm M’s system A1B2 with the firm B’s
good B1, the quality of the resulting system A1B2B1 which we denote by χ121 is given
by the quality of χ11 of the best system A1B1. In turn, mixed-bundling is not a feasible
bundling option for firm M. Therefore, in the game defined in the previous subsection,
firm M chooses only between pure bundling and no bundling. For simplicity, from now
on we can skip the unnecessary attribute ”pure” and will simply talk about bundling.
Note that theoretically firm M should be able to charge its adjacent-submarket good at
a negative price. On the one hand, this would strengthen its resistance to the competition
of the higher-quality entrant. On the other hand, firm M can cover the resulting losses
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by the extra consumer surplus it could extract through the sales of its core-submarket
good to higher-taste consumers. However, negative pricing is hardly implementable when
consumers can purchase and use more than one type B good in a system combination
with a type A good. It is difficult for firm M to charge in practice B2 a negative price
because this implies that firm M should in fact pay not only the consumers who buy
its core-submarket good but also the one who combines its adjacent-submarket good
with the good of the inferior-quality entrant. However, this would give all consumers
an incentive to buy B2 and be paid whether they need it or not, because firm M
cannot distinguish between consumers who use it alone and those who use also B1.
Carlton and Waldman (2002) show that this pricing strategy which they call ”virtual tying”
could have the same entry-deterrence outcome as pure bundling. In such a case however,
negative pricing is easy to be proven and prosecuted as illegal practice. Therefore, when
defining the producer side in the previous subsection, we precluded negative pricing and
do not consider it as a feasible price choice in the non-bundling case.
Because consumers have, at most, unit consumption of a good and their tastes
are uniformly distributed within the market range
(
θ ≤ θ ≤ θ
)
, the bounds of the
market shares of the product pairs are marked by the taste parameters of the so-called
“marginal consumers”. A marginal consumer is defined as the consumer whose
taste θi j/i′ j′ , i 6= i′ ∧ j 6= j′, makes it indifferent between given distinct pair of systems
AiB j and Ai′B j′ .
The expression for the marginal consumer’s taste variable could be directly derived
from (4):
Ui j =Ui′ j′ ⇒ θi j/i′ j′ =
pi j− pi′ j′
χi j−χi′ j′
=





θi j/i′ j′ – marginal taste at which consumers are indifferent between systems AiB j and
Ai′B j′ , i 6= i′ ∧ j 6= j′
di j/i′ j′ – the difference in qualities between systems AiB j and Ai′B j′ , di j/i′ j′ = χi j−χi′ j′
Given that all the three firms enter the market and all the four systems in table 1 have
positive market shares, the latter can be expressed as follows:
D11 =

θ −θ11/12, if A1 and B2 are sold separately or in a bundle alone




θ11/12−θ12/21, if A1 and B2 are sold separately or in a bundle alone




θ12/21−θ21/22, if A1 and B2 are sold separately or in a bundle alone




θ21/22−θ , if θ22/0 ≤ θ
θ21/22−θ22/0, if θ22/0 > θ
(9)
where:
θ22/0 – marginal taste at which consumers are indifferent between system A2B2 and




d22/0 – quality difference between A2B2 and the outside option, d22/0 = χ22−χ0
If only the best and the worst systems, A1B1 and A2B2, have positive market shares,
the latter are given by the following expressions:
D11 = θ −θ11/22 (10)
D22 = θ11/22−θ (11)
Analogously, for the case when firm M is a monopolist in sub-market A, if both the
systems that could be formed have positive market shares, we can express them as follows:
D11 = θ −θ11/12 (12)
D12 =

θ11/12−θ , if θ12/0 ≤ θ for A1 and B2 sold separately
θ11/12−θ12/0, if θ12/0 > θ for A1 and B2 sold separately
θ −θ , if θ12/0 ≤ θ for A1 and B2 sold in a bundle only
θ −θ12/0, if θ12/0 > θ for A1 and B2 sold in a bundle only
(13)
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In what follows we solve the model for the following three particular market settings:
Setting 1: Firm A is excluded from the set of players. The endpoints of the support
interval of the consumer taste uniform distribution and the system quality differences are












In subsection 3.3.1 we claim and then in appendix section F we show that at the above
conditions of setting 1 firm M has no incentive to sell its good B2 in the adjacent
sub-market at a non-bundling equilibrium but strictly prefers to accommodate the superior
quality entrant, firm B, at a bundling equilibrium.
Setting 2: The set of players includes all three firms. The endpoints of the support
interval of the consumer taste uniform distribution and the system quality differences are













In subsection 3.3.2 we claim and then in appendix section G we show that the above
conditions of setting 2 are sufficient for having all systems with positive demands at a
non-bundling equilibrium and all three firms with positive market shares at a bundling
equilibrium.
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Setting 3: The set of players includes all three firms. The endpoints of the support
interval of the consumer taste uniform distribution and the system quality differences are


















In subsection 3.3.3 we claim and then in appendix section H we show that the above
conditions of setting 3 are sufficient for having only the two most differentiated systems,
A1B1 and A2B2, with positive demands at a non-bundling equilibrium, and the entry of
firm A effectively deterred at a bundling equilibrium.
The inequality conditions in (16) could hold together only if the condition in (17)
is satisfied. Similarly, the joint validity of the two inequalities in (18) is possible only
when (19) holds true. Also, the right-hand side of (16) is smaller while the left-hand
side of (19) is larger than 12θ so that the feasible intervals of θ at settings 2 and 3
have no intersection. Accordingly, setting 2 represents a market that has more
variegated consumer tastes than the market represented by setting 3. Furthermore, at
setting 2, product differentiation decreases in system quality, making the competition
between the top-ranked systems stronger, while at setting 3 it is the other way around.
Quality differentiation increases in system quality, making the competition between the
bottom-ranked systems stronger. Hence, even though we do not need to introduce
an explicitly defined quality accumulation function for all the settings, the inequality
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condition in (17) implicitly specifies the following particular requirements on how the
quality accumulation function should behave in setting 2:
























Ai - exogenously determined quality of good Ai, i = 1, 2; A1 > A2





- implicit functional relationship between the quality of a system and the
qualities of the goods of which it consists.
Similarly, the inequality condition in (19) implicitly specifies the following particular
requirements on how the quality accumulation function should behave in setting 3:























The equilibrium solutions for settings 1, 2, and 3 are represented in appendix sections
F, G and H, respectively. The solution for each setting starts with the derivation of
the pricing-stage subgame equilibrium which determines the equilibrium market shares
of the entrants in each setting. The results allow us to define the optimal decisions
of the firms at the entry stage by backward induction and deduce the optimal market
structure at equilibrium. Finally, we apply the concept of perfect subgame equilibrium
of Selten (1975) to justify the strict dominance of a pure bundling over a non-bundling
strategy for the multi-product firm at each of the three settings. The results are established




Setting 1 provides a scenario where on the one hand, if firm M is not allowed to apply
bundling strategies, it is strictly better off of entering the market as a single-product firm
operating alone in the core sub-market. On the other hand, if it is allowed to use bundling,
firm M prefers to accommodate firm B by not preventing consumers from upgrading
its bundled system A1B2 with the entrant’s superior-quality good B1. The respective
equilibria are established below in proposition 1 and proposition 2, respectively.
Proposition 1. Let the market be characterized by the conditions of setting 1 in (14)
and (15), so that firm M is the only entrant in sub-market A, faces an entry threat in
sub-market B and exogenous restriction on the use of bundling. Then, there is a unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this restricted non-bundling game. At this equilibrium
firm M enters only the core sub-market A while firm B enters and operates alone in
the adjacent market B. The optimal strategies of the two firms at the pricing stage is
accordingly given by the symmetric set of prices in (F16).8 The corresponding outcome
is that only system A1B1 has positive demand and the market is not covered.
Proof: see section F of the appendix.
In the restricted game where firm M is not allowed to choose bundling at the second
stage, there are two possibilities for the multi-product firm. To enter both sub-markets and
charge its goods prices, the sum of which is sufficiently low for the market to be exactly
covered and both systems A1B1 and A1B2 to have positive demands. Or, alternatively, to
enter the core sub-market only and to charge its good A1 at a price at which consumers
buy it only in combination with the superior-quality good B1. In the latter case, the market
would not be covered provided that consumer tastes are sufficiently variegated to satisfy
condition (14). Still, as long as the superior-quality good is sufficiently differentiated
from good B2 so that the condition in (15) holds, firm M could extract more consumer
8The expressions derived in the appendix have separate numeration for each section of the appendix
which is marked by the letter of the corresponding section, e.g. (F16) is derived in section F of the appendix.
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surplus by selling A1 solely in a system with B1. Therefore, the entry of firm M as a
single-product firm in the core sub-market only, strictly dominates the other option in the
non-bundling game.
Proposition 2. Let again the conditions of setting 1 in (14) and (15) hold, so that
firm M is the only entrant in sub-market A, faces an entry threat in sub-market B, but is
now also allowed to bundle its goods. Then, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the (unrestricted) game. At this equilibrium firm M enters the both sub-markets
and offers its goods only in a bundle but since consumers are allowed to upgrade the
bundled system A1B2 with good B1, firm B enters the adjacent sub-market as well. The
optimal strategies of the two firms are given by the symmetric price set in (F39). The
corresponding equilibrium outcome implies that the bundling strategy is only weakly
dominating the non-bundling one.
Proof: see section F of the appendix.
The result in proposition 2 should not come as a surprise after noticing that consumers
value the upgraded system A1B2B1 and the best-quality system A1B1 the same. Therefore,
the same consumers who buy A1B1 at the non-bundling equilibrium established in
proposition 1 are the ones that buy A1B2B1 at the bundling equilibrium in proposition 2.
Accordingly, firm M charges them at the same price for the bundled system as for A1
when sold alone. So, the payoffs of the two firms are identical at both equilibria. Bundling
simply makes the purchase of good A1 conditional on the purchase of good B2 which
drives consumers who would otherwise buy only A1B1 to get it together with A2. Thus
firm M has positive sales in both sub-markets and therefore at equilibrium enters with two
goods.
The weak dominance of the bundling strategy in the subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome established in proposition 2 depends primarily on the assumptions for the
variegation of consumer tastes and quality differentiation in (14) and (15), respectively.
When the latter conditions are not satisfied, it could be optimal for firm M to choose a
pricing strategy at which the market would be covered and its system A1B2 would be
demanded even without bundling applied (see (F21) and (F42) in the appendix).
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3.3.2 Setting 2
Setting 2 is introduced to show that if bundling is precluded, zero-pricing could be an
optimal choice of firm M without causing effective exclusion of any of its rivals in the
two sub-markets. On the other hand, if allowed, firm M would strictly prefer to offer its
goods only in a bundled system, but this would not have an effect on the entry decision of
its potential entrants. The respective equilibria are established below in proposition 3 and
4, respectively
Proposition 3. Let the market be characterized by the conditions of setting 2
in (16) and (17), so that firm M faces potential competition by firms A and B in the
two respective sub-markets, but the use of product bundling is precluded. Then there
is a unique covered-market non-bundling subgame equilibrium at which all firms make
a market entry and all the four systems in table 1 have positive sales, even though it is
optimal for firm M to charge good B2 a zero price. The equilibrium is characterized by
the prices in (G13) – (G15).
Proof: see section G of the appendix.
The key implication of the result in proposition 3 is that even though good B2 is
charged zero price, all firms still enter the two sub-markets so that none of them is
monopolized. The outcome could be explained by the same reasoning provided in the
previous subsection as to why firm M would prefer to enter as a single-product firm in
the core sub-market if it is prevented from using product bundling at the conditions of
setting 1. Again, the lower price firm M charges B2, the higher the price at which it
could sell A1. Therefore, by charging the lowest possible (zero) price for B2, firm M
actually maximizes the consumer surplus it could extract through selling A1 as a part of
the best-quality systems.
A reasonable question that occurs is why, at setting 2, firm M would choose to sell
B2 even at zero price. The answer is hidden behind the observation that distinct from
setting 1, at setting 2 firm M is not a monopolist in sub-market A, but is instead assumed
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to face the threat of entry of firm A. As a result, even if the market power of the firms
in sub-market A is exogenously set to be larger than in sub-market B, this would hold
true only if we have a duopoly in each of the two sub-markets. Accordingly, if firm M
decides to enter only the submarket A as at setting 1, it will leave firm B operating alone in
sub-market B. At setting 2, however, because there is a duopoly in sub-market A, the latter
will be characterized by stronger competition and therefore, it will become an adjacent
market, while sub-market B will become a core market.9 So, firm M could only save its
position as a quality leader in the core market by entering both sub-markets, which in fact
also saves the positive sales and profit of firm A. In turn, all four systems have positive
demands and the market is covered.
Proposition 4. Let the market be characterized by the conditions of setting 2 in (16)
and (17) and firm M is allowed to offer its goods in a bundle in response to the potential
competition by firm A and firm B in the two respective sub-markets. Then there is
a unique bundling subgame equilibrium at which the entry of firm A is not efficiently
deterred even though the worst-ranked system A2B2 is excluded from the set of systems
demanded at equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by the prices in (G41) – (G43).
Proof: see section G of the appendix.
Even if allowed, consumers would still have no incentive to combine the bundled
system with the inferior good in market A because it does not provide them with any
additional utility, in contrast to the case when A1B2 is upgraded by B1. So, consumers
have no reason to buy A2 in addition to A1B2. As a result, bundling reduces down to
three the number of systems with positive demands at equilibrium. However, bundling
cannot prevent consumers from purchasing the good of firm A in a system with the good
of firm B. At the conditions of setting 2, consumer tastes are variegated enough and A2B1
is sufficiently differentiated from A1B2 for the former to have positive market share.
Firm M gains higher profit at the equilibrium in proposition 4 which implies that, if
9For explicit solution of the case of a single-product monopolist in one of the sub-markets and a potential
duopoly in the other, see appendix section B of the second chapter of this thesis.
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allowed at the conditions of setting 2, it would strictly prefer to offer its goods in a bundle
and not separately. Note, however, that, here, distinct from the bundling equilibrium
established in proposition 2, because firm M faces competition in both sub-markets,
its payoff given bundling is strictly less than what it would gain if it entered as a
single-product firm in sub-market A only. In the latter case, the equilibrium outcome
is the same as at the equilibrium established in proposition 2. The only difference is in
the competitive interaction between the firms that leads to this outcome.
Finally, note that compared to the outcome at the equilibrium established in
proposition 3, at the bundling-equilibrium in proposition 4, firm M increases the market
shares of its goods A1 and B2. However, this is at the expense of the reduced profits and
market shares of firms A and B. That is, at the conditions of setting 2, pure bundling has
the potential to restrict the consumer networks of firm A and firm B which in turn could
reduce the qualities of their goods in the presence of positive network externalities.
3.3.3 Setting 3
Setting 3 reveals the decisive importance of consumer taste variegation, and the
differentiation of the systems for the effective entry-deterrence outcome of bundling.
On the one hand, we show that when consumer tastes do not vary in a wide range,
there cannot be a solution of the restricted non-bundling game at which all the four
systems have positive market shares. On the other hand, we demonstrate that when the
lower-quality systems are more differentiated from the best system than from the worst,
the entrants’ system A2B1 cannot have a positive market share at equilibrium with or
without bundling allowed. Thus, it appears as one of the two necessary conditions for
the effective entry-deterrence of firm A. The second necessary condition is the use of
bundling by firm M, which, as was already discussed in the previous subsection, makes
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system A2B2 unavailable, but has no direct effect on the demand for A2B1.
The non-bundling equilibrium is established in proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5. When conditions (18) and (19) are satisfied, a unique non-bundling
subgame equilibrium exists, at which all firms enter the two markets but only the two most
differentiated systems in table 1 have positive sales. The equilibrium is characterized by
the prices in (H6) – (H9).
Proof: see section H of the appendix.
The left-hand side inequality condition of setting 3 in (18) restricts the variegation
of consumer tastes. The lowest taste θ is required to be less than two times smaller
than the highest taste θ . As a result, the market demand is concentrated over a limited
number of systems at equilibrium. Specifically, we cannot have all the four systems sold
in positive amounts as at the equilibrium outcome of setting 2. In addition, the inequality
conditions in (19) imply that when compared to the best system A1B1, the worst system
A2B2 is more differentiated from the outside option and less differentiated from A1B2 and
A2B1. This makes firm M prefer to sell B2 as a part of system A2B2 alone at a covered
market. Furthermore, the latter outcome is achievable at a positive price of B2. However,
the market-covering price of B2 also undercuts system A2B1, when the variegation of
consumer tastes is not too restricted, which is ensured by the right-hand side inequality
condition of setting 3 in (18). As a result, the equilibrium established in proposition 5
leads to an outcome that cannot occur at setting 2. Only the two most differentiated
systems have positive demands. Still all three firms have an incentive to enter the market
because they make positive profits at equilibrium.
The bundling solution is established in proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6. When conditions (18) and (19) are satisfied, there is a unique
bundling subgame equilibrium, at which the entry of firm A is efficiently deterred. The
corresponding equilibrium outcome coincides with the bundling subgame equilibrium
outcome at setting 1. Accordingly, the equilibrium prices of firm M and firm B are given
by the symmetric set of prices in (F39) while firm M does not enter the market. This is
also the subgame-perfect equilibrium solution of the model at setting 3.
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Proof: see section H of the appendix.
Like the bundling equilibrium outcome at setting 2, the outcome from the bundling
equilibrium established in proposition 6 prevents firm A from selling its good in a system
with the good of firm M. The variegation of consumer tastes, however, is restricted by
the left-hand side inequality condition of setting 3 in (18). Therefore, the other system in
which firm A could sell its good, A2B2, also has no demand. As a result, firm A would
be effectively deterred in the case that firm M chooses to bundle its goods. The bundling
strategy is optimal for firm M because it leads to the equilibrium outcome described in
proposition 2. In particular, firm M is a monopolist in submarket A which allows it to
maximize the consumer surplus it extracts by only selling its goods in a bundled system
upgraded by B1.
As a final step of our analysis we measure the social welfare effect of the exclusion of
firm A at the bundling subgame equilibrium established in proposition 5, relative to the
non-bundling subgame equilibrium in proposition 6. The results are formally stated in
proposition 7 below.
Proposition 7. When conditions (18) – (19) are satisfied, allowing for bundling
has strictly negative social welfare at equilibrium. Both producer surplus and consumer
surplus are lower at the bundling equilibrium established in proposition 6, relative to the
non-bundling equilibrium in proposition 5.
Proof: see section H of the appendix.
Bundling affects social welfare in two ways. On the one hand, by excluding good A2
from the market, it leads to an increase in the average quality of the systems available
in the market. However, at optimal prices, the systems available in the market are more
expensive. Therefore, consumers with lower taste prefer to switch to the outside option
which leads to decrease in the consumer surplus.10 The inequality conditions of setting 3
10Note that the dominance of the negative effect would be stronger in the presence of positive network
externalities as in the setup suggested by Carlton and Waldman (2002).
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in (19) imply that the systems containing A2 are not much differentiated from the systems
containing A1. Therefore, the negative effect of the market exclusion of A2 dominates
the positive effect. Additionally, the market share of the bundled system also decreases,
which reduces the producer surplus. Therefore, at setting 3 the social effect of bundling
is negative.
3.4 Conclusion
In the presented paper we examine how important the quality differentiation of systems
and the variability of consumer tastes are for the entry-deterrence effect of bundling
implemented by a multi-product firm. We propose the solution of three particular market
settings for vertically differentiated systems.
First, we demonstrate the importance of quality differentiation for the exclusionary
effect of bundling in a simple market setting where a multi-product firm is monopolist in
the (core) sub-market for one of the system elements, and faces a superior-quality entry
threat in the other (adjacent) sub-market. Since consumers value systems that include the
entrant’s good more highly, the multi-product firm gains more from selling its monopoly
good only as part of such a system. This allows it to extract more consumer surplus than
if it sells its bundled system alone. However, if the multi-product firm does not bundle,
it is suboptimal for it to sell in the adjacent sub-market. Thus, in this particular setting,
the multi-product firm faces the dilemma of whether to sell its goods only bundled in a
system or to turn itself into a single-product firm operating solely in the core sub-market.
In both cases, the multi-product firm would have the same profit and market share in the
monopoly sub-market.
Second, we analyze a market setting in which the multi-product firm faces an entry
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threat from a potential inferior-quality rival in the core sub-market, and from a potential
superior-quality rival in the adjacent sub-market. In addition, for this particular setting
we assume that the lower-quality systems are more differentiated than the higher-quality
systems and consumer tastes are sufficiently variegated for showing that at these
assumptions all three firms could have positive market share both at a non-bundled and
bundled equilibrium. As in the first setting, consumers value the system formed by the
goods of the multi-product firm and the superior-quality entrant most highly. Unlike the
first setting, however, the multi-product firm cannot afford to exit the adjacent sub-market,
because then the superior-quality entrant will have more market power to extract a larger
share of the consumer surplus. Therefore, at the non-bundling equilibrium established in
the paper, the multi-product firm chooses to stay, though only symbolically, in the adjacent
sub-market by charging its good at a zero price. That is, it makes no profit directly from its
sales in the adjacent sub-market but at the same time this allows it to preserve its dominant
share of the extracted consumer surplus. Given bundling, the system formed by the goods
of the multi-product firm and the good of the inferior entrant will be more expensive and of
lower quality than the bundled system alone. Accordingly, at a pure-bundling equilibrium
the core-submarket entrant sells its good only combined in a system with the good of the
entrant in the adjacent submarket.
Third, again we consider a multi-product firm facing a potential inferior-quality entrant
in the core sub-market, and potential superior-quality entrant in the adjacent sub-market.
Distinct from the second setting, however, in this third setting we assume that the
lower-quality systems are not more differentiated than the higher-quality systems and
consumer tastes are not variegated enough to ensure demand for the goods of all the three
firms at a pure-bundling equilibrium. As a result, we show that the adjacent-submarket
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good of the multi-product firm cannot be sold as an element of more than one system
either at a non-bundling or at a pure-bundling equilibrium. At the non-bundling
equilibrium, it could be sold only as a positively priced element of the system it forms
with the good of the inferior-quality entrant. At the pure-bundling equilibrium, the
multi-product firm’s core-submarket good could be sold only as an element of the bundled
system. In turn, this will lead to effective exclusion of the inferior-quality rival. The
latter case brings higher profit to the multi-product firm but has a negative effect on both
producer and consumer surplus, resulting in decreased social welfare.
In summary, we could infer from our results that the variability of consumer tastes
and the pattern of quality differentiation are decisive for the entry-deterrence effect of
the bundling or pricing strategies of a multi-product firm in a market for vertically
differentiated systems. Therefore, these market characteristics should not be neglected
when analyzing the competition in vertically differentiated markets for systems. The more
differentiated the low-ranked systems’ qualities and the further variegated the consumer
tastes, the less likely it is that pure bundling could effectively exclude an inferior-quality
entrant from the core sub-market. Furthermore, the multi-product firm strictly gains from
accommodating a superior-quality rival in the adjacent sub-market.
147
References
Berg, S.V. and Weisman, D.L. (1992), ’A Guide to cross-subsidization and price
predation’, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 16 (6), pp. 447–459.
Bresnahan, T.F. (2001), ‘Network effects and Microsoft’, Mimeo, Department of
Economics, Stanford University.
Bolton, P., Brodley, J.F. and Riordan, M.H. (2000), ”Predatory pricing: Strategic theory
and legal policy”, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 88, pp. 2239–2330.
Carlton, D.W. and Waldman, M. (2002), ‘The strategic use of tying to preserve and
create market power in evolving industries’, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (2),
pp. 194–220.
Chamberlin, E. (1933), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, pp. 1–396.
Chen, Z. amd Rey, P. (2013), ’Competitive cross-subsidization’, IDEI Working Papers
No. 808, Institut D’Economie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse School of Economics.
Choi, J.P. (2004), ‘Tying and innovation: A dynamic analysis of tying arrangements’,
Economic Journal, Vol. 114 (492), pp. 83–101.
Choi, J.P., Lee, G., Stefanadis, C. (2001), ‘Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage
Theory’, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 (1), pp. 52–71.
Choi, J.P., Lee, G., Stefanadis, C. (2003), ‘The effects of integration on R&D incentives
in system markets’, Netnomics, Vol. 5 (1), pp. 21–32.
Davis, S., MacCrisken, J. and K. Murphy (1999), ‘The evolution of the PC operation
system: An economic analysis of software design’, in Microsoft, Antitrust and the
New Economy: Selected Essays, edited by D.S. Evans, Kluwer Academic Publisher,
148
Boston, pp. 361–419.
Eckert, A. and West, D.S. (2003), ’Testing for predation by a multiproduct retailer’, in
The Pros and Cons of Low Prices, Swedish Competition Authority, Stockholm.
Economides, N. (1989), ‘The desirability of compatibility in the absence of network
externalities’, American Economic Review, Vol. 71 (5), pp. 1165–1181.
Economides, N. (2001), ‘The Microsoft antitrust case’, Journal of Industry, Competition
and Trade, Vol. 1(1), pp. 7–39.
Economides, N. and I. Liannos (2009), ’The quest for appropriate remedies in the
Microsoft antitrust EU cases: a comparative appraisal,’ Working papers 09-15, Leonard
N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, New York University.
Evans, D.S., Hagiu, A. and R. Schmalensee (2005), ‘A survey of the economic
role of software platforms in computer-based industries’, CESifo Economic Studies,
Vol. 51 (2-3), pp. 189–224.
Farrell, J. and Katz, M. (2000), ‘Innovation, rent extraction, and integration in system
markets’, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 48 (4), pp. 413–432.
Faulhaber, G.R. (1975), ’Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises’, The
American Economic Review, Vol. 65 (5), pp. 966–977
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (2000), ‘Pricing a network good to deter entry’, The Journal
of Industrial Economics, Vol. 48 (4), pp. 373–390.
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Appendix (Mathematical Proofs)
F. Solution for Setting 1 - Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
In this section, we derive the solution of the game for setting 1.
We start with an analysis of the (reduced) non-bundling game equilibrium and the
proof of proposition 1.
First, we need to check what the optimal pricing strategies of firms M and B would be
if they expected the market to be covered (i.e. θ12/0≤ θ ) and both systems A1B1 and A1B2
(i.e. θ < θ11/12 < θ ), which could be formed by their goods to have positive demands.
The equilibrium prices are given by the solutions of the revenue-maximization problems
of the two firms derived by substituting with the corresponding expressions for D11 and






















The optimal solutions for the above pair of problems is given by the solution of the
following system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS1NoBc12M
∂ pA1













11The superscript S1NoBc12 stands for setting 1 (S1), non-bundling (NoB) equilibrium, covered (c)
market with both the systems of quality ranks 1 and 2 (12) having positive demands.
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Note, however, that the first equation in (F3) can never be satisfied when the condition of
setting 1 in (14) holds. Therefore, we have a corner solution for pA1 given by the highest
value of the price of good A1 at which the market would still be covered by system A1B2,
i.e. θ12/0 ≤ θ :















The market shares of the two systems A1B1 and A1B2 at the optimal prices in (F4) are as
follows:









Trivially, both expressions above are positive when the condition of setting 1 in (14) holds.













The condition of setting 1 in (14) is not sufficient for the price of good A1 in (F4) to





Otherwise, good A1 will have a zero optimal price and the optimal revenue of firm M will
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Second, we need to check what the optimal pricing strategies of firms M and B
would be if they expected the market to be non-covered (i.e. θ12/0 > θ ) and both
systems A1B1 and A1B2 (i.e. θ12/0 < θ11/12 < θ ), which could be formed by their
goods to have positive demands. The equilibrium prices are again given by the solutions
of the revenue-maximization problems of the two firms derived by substituting with

























The optimal solutions for the above pair of problems is given by the solution of the
following system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS1NoBn12M
∂ pA1

















12The superscript S1NoBn12 stands for setting 1 (S1), non-bundling (NoB) equilibrium, non-covered (n)
market with both the systems of quality ranks 1 and 2 (12) having positive demands.
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Note that this time the optimal expression for the price of good B2 does not satisfy
the non-negativity condition. The optimal price of good B2 is therefore given by the
zero-price corner solution. However, at the optimal prices in (F12) the initially assumed
expectations of the firms for both systems A1B1 and A1B2 having positive demands are
not met. Particularly, there is no demand for system A1B2 because the two marginal taste
variables whose difference gives the demand for A1B2 have identical values:






Hence, there is not such a non-bundling equilibrium at which the market is not covered
and the both systems A1B1 and A1B2 have positive demands.
Accordingly, if firm M still expects the market not to be covered at a non-bundling
equilibrium, its revenue-maximization problem should reflect the result in (F13). That
is, it should represent firm M’s revenue function when firm M is a single-product firm









13The superscript S1NoBn1 stands for setting 1 (S1), non-bundling (NoB) equilibrium, non-covered (n)










Thus, firm M is in an identical position as firm B. Therefore, the corresponding solution







The market share of system A1B1 is as follows:











Third, we compare the revenue expression in (F18) with that of firm M at the















The expression in (F19) is strictly decreasing in θ for any value of it satisfying the
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At θ = θ2 , however, the revenue difference in (F19) is strictly positive when the conditions













Analogously, we could also compare the revenue expression in (F18) with that of firm M
at the covered-market non-bundling equilibrium in (F8) for the case when (F7) is not










Note that the difference in the brackets is strictly positive when the condition of setting 1
in (14) is satisfied. So, in the non-bundling subgame firm M is strictly better off to enter
as a single-product firm in the core-submarket only and set price for A1 at which only
system A1B1 has positive demand in a non-covered market. This completes the proof of
proposition 1.
Next, we continue with the proof of proposition 2.
We derive below the equilibrium solution of the pure-bundling subgame that would
follow after firm M chooses to enter with both its good, A1 and B2, offered in a bundle
only.
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First, we need to check what the optimal pricing strategies of firms M and B would be if
they expected the market to be covered (i.e. θ12/0≤ θ ) and both systems A1B2B1 and A1B2
(i.e. θ < θ11/12 < θ ), which could be formed by their goods to have positive demands.
The equilibrium prices are again given by the solutions of the revenue-maximization
problems of the two firms derived by substituting with the corresponding expressions
















The optimal solutions for the above pair of problems is given by the solution of the
following system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS1Bc12M
∂ pM
= θ −θ = 0
∂RS1Bc12B
∂ pB1




As in the solution for the non-bundling covered-market equilibrium, the first equation
in (F25) can never be satisfied when the condition of setting 1 in (14) holds. Therefore,
we have a corner solution for pM given by the highest value of the price of the bundled







The market shares of the two systems A1B2B1 and A1B2 at the optimal prices in (F26) are
14The superscript S1Bc12 stands for setting 1 (S1), bundling (B) equilibrium, covered (c) market with
both the systems of quality ranks 1 and 2 (12) having positive demands.
157
as follows:









The value of the revenue of firm M at the optimal prices in (F26) is given by the following
expression:
RS1Bc12∗M = (θ −θ)θd12/0 (F28)
Note that the condition of setting 1 in (14) is necessary but not sufficient for the demand






Otherwise, a solution would not exist with an equilibrium outcome at which the market
is covered and both systems, A1B2B1 and A1B2, having positive demands. Instead only












which is strictly smaller than the revenue in (F28) when the condition of setting 1 in (15)
holds.
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Second, we need to check what the optimal pricing strategies of firms M and B
would be if they expected the market to be non-covered (i.e. θ12/0 > θ ) and both
systems A1B2B1 and A1B2 (i.e. θ < θ11/12 < θ ), which could be formed by their goods
to have positive demands. The equilibrium prices are again given by the solutions
of the revenue-maximization problems of the two firms derived by substituting with


















The optimal solutions for the above pair of problems is given by the solution of the
following system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS1Bn12M
∂ pM

















Again, the corresponding solution implies zero demand for the bundle alone. Firm M,
15The superscript S1Bn12 stands for setting 1 (S1), bundling (B) equilibrium, non-covered (n) market
with both the systems of quality ranks 1 and 2 (12) having positive demands.
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Consumers are not given an option to purchase A1 without B2. Therefore, whoever buys
the best system A1B1 receives B2 together with it. The corresponding equilibrium prices

























As in the solution for the non-bundling covered-market equilibrium, firm M is in identical







The market share of the upgraded system A1B2B1 is as follows:











Third, we compare the revenue expression in (F41) with that of firm M at the
16The superscript S1Bn1 stands for setting 1 (S1), bundling (B) equilibrium, non-covered (n) market with
only the (upgraded) system of quality rank 1 (1) having positive demand.
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The revenue difference in (F42) is strictly positive when the conditions of setting 1 in
(14) and (15) hold. Since the revenue of firm M in (F31) is strictly exceeded by RS1Bc12∗M
in (F28), we could conclude that the two alternative covered-market pricing strategies of
firm M are strictly dominated by its non-covered market strategy in (F39). Hence, firm M
is strictly better off from setting a price of its bundled system at which only the consumers
who prefer the upgraded system A1B2B1 buy it and in turn the market is not covered.
Finally, note that allowing for bundling does not change the optimal payoffs of the two














Hence, the bundling strategy only weakly dominates the no bundling strategy of firm M.
The only difference between the subgame-perfect equilibria of the (reduced) non-bundling
game and the bundling game is that consumers are not given an option to buy A1 alone
without B2 so that the latter has positive demand:
DS1Bn1∗B2 = D
S1Bn1
11 > 0 = D
S1NoBn1∗
B2 (F44)
which completes the proof of proposition 2.
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G. Solution for Setting 2 - Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
In this section, we derive the solution of the game for setting 2.
We start with analysis of the (reduced) non-bundling game equilibrium and the proof of
proposition 3.
First, we need to check what would be the optimal pricing strategies of the three firms
if they are all expected to enter the market, and for their systems to have positive market
shares but still not to cover the market. The equilibrium prices are given by the solutions
of the revenue-maximization problems of the two firms, derived by substituting with the












































(pA1 + pB2)− (pA2 + pB1)
d12/21




17The superscript S2NoBn1234 stands for setting 2 (S2), non-bundling (NoB) equilibrium,
non-covered (n) market with all the four systems of quality ranks 1, 2, 3 and 4 (1234) having positive
demands.
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The optimal solution of the above problems is given by the solution of the following
system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS2NoBn1234M
∂ pA1































(pA1 + pB2)− (2pA2 + pB1)
d12/21




Since the resulting expressions for the optimal prices that come from the solution
of (G4) are very large we do not state them explicitly here but instead focus only on























































Note that both the expressions for X and for Z are strictly positive, and since their ratio
enters with a negative sign in (G5), the latter does not satisfy the non-negativity condition.
Therefore, we must have a corner solution pS2NoBn1234∗B2 = 0 at the pricing subgame















Accordingly, the equations in (G6) imply that, at the pricing subgame equilibrium, the
marginal taste variables must be characterized by the following relationship:
θ > 2θ12/21 > 4θ22/0 (G7)
Hence, when (16) holds we have that θ > θ22/0 i.e. the assumption for the existence of
non-covered market equilibrium is not satisfied.
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Second, we need to check what would be the optimal pricing strategies of the three
firms if they all are again expected to enter the market, their systems to have positive
market shares but now also the market needs to be covered. The equilibrium prices are
given by the solutions of the revenue-maximization problems of the two firms derived by
substituting with the corresponding expressions for D11, D12, D21 and D22 from (6) to (9)















































The optimal solution of the above problems is given by the solution of the following
18The superscript S2NoBc1234 stands for setting 2 (S2), non-bundling (NoB) equilibrium, covered (c)
market with all the four systems of quality ranks 1, 2, 3 and 4 (1234) having positive demands.
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system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS2NoBc1234M
∂ pA1

































The solution of the equations above results in a set of optimal pricing expressions which















)) < 0 (G12)
which trivially does not satisfy the non-negative constraint. Therefore, we must have a
corner solution pS2NoBn1234∗B2 = 0 at the pricing subgame equilibrium. Then, the rest of the






























Note that both the expressions for pS2NoBc1234A1 and p
S2NoBc1234
B1 in (G13) and (G14),
respectively, are strictly positive for any θ < θ , which holds by definition. The expression











which is less strict than the condition on θ from above in (16) for any d21/22 >
d11/12
2 .
Accordingly, the validity of the latter inequality is ensured by the condition in (17). After
substituting for pS2NoBn1234∗B2 = 0 and p
S2NoBc1234
A2 from (G15) into the general expression
for the marginal taste variable θ22/0 given in the description of (9), we derive θ22/0 below







































Accordingly, the condition in (G18) is less strict than the condition on θ from below
in (16) for any d22/0 >
10
9 d12/21 given that d21/22 >
3
2d11/12. Both inequalities are ensured
by the condition in (17). After substituting for the optimal prices from (G13) – (G15) in



































6d1221d2122 +2d1112 (3d1221 +2d2122)
(G22)
It is trivial that the demand expression for system A1B1 in (G19) is always strictly positive.











The right-hand side is positive for any d21/22 > d11/12 and less strict than the condition
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on θ from above in (16) when d21/22 >
3
2d11/12. The validity of both inequalities is
ensured by the condition in (17).











Note, however, that the right-hand side of (G24) is equal to the right-hand side of (G23),
that is it is strictly negative for any d21/22 > d11/12 which is ensured by the condition
in (17). Because θ is positive by definition, the condition in (G24) holds true and A2B1
has a positive demand.
Finally, the positivity of (G22) is ensured by the very condition on θ from above
in (16).
Hence, the initial assumption that all the four systems have positive demands holds at
the equilibrium given by the set of prices (G13) – (G15) when the conditions in (16)
and (17) are satisfied. It could be shown (see section H of the appendix), that the
latter conditions have no intersection with the corresponding conditions for having an
equilibrium solution of the non-bundling game, where some of the systems do not have
positive demand. Since the three firms make positive sales, they all have an incentive
to enter the market at the first stage. Thus, the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
non-bundling game established in proposition 3 is unique which completes its proof.
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The proof of proposition 4 follows the same steps but applied to the extended game
allowing for bundling at the second stage.
We need to check what would be the optimal pricing strategies of the three firms if they
are all expected to enter the market, firm M to offer its good only in a bundle. Note that
consumers have no incentive to buy the bundled system upgraded by the inferior-quality
good A2. Therefore, system A2B2 cannot have positive demand at equilibrium. Still, we
assume that the other three systems have positive market shares.
First, we check for the existence of equilibrium at which the market is not covered.
If we assume that the bundled system is sold not only upgraded by A1, but also alone,
the equilibrium prices are given by the solutions of the revenue-maximization problems
of the two firms derived by substituting with the corresponding expressions for D11, D12

















pM− (pA2 + pB1)
d12/21








pM− (pA2 + pB1)
d12/21




19The superscript S2Bn123 stands for setting 2 (S2), bundling (B) equilibrium, non-covered (n) market
with only the systems of quality ranks 1, 2, 3 (123) having positive demands.
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The optimal solution of the above problems is given by the solution of the following
system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS2Bn123M
∂ pM
















pM− (2pA2 + pB1)
d12/21



































After substituting for the optimal prices from (G29), (G30) and (G31) in (5), we could
derive the equilibrium expressions for the marginal taste variables, θ11/12 and θ12/21, the




















which is strictly positive for d11/12 <
d21/0(2d21/0+d12/21)
3(d21/0+d12/21)
i.e. when d21/0 > 3d11/12.
Therefore, when the condition in (17) is satisfied, the assumption that the bundled system
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is sold not only upgraded by A1, but also alone, holds true at equilibrium.







































The right-hand side of the inequality in (G18), however, is strictly smaller than the











The condition in (G35) is satisfied when (17) holds true. Furthermore, the right-hand
side of (G36) is strictly negative when the condition in (G35) is satisfied. Hence, since
d11/12 is positive by definition, when (17) holds, there cannot be non-covered market
equilibrium of the bundling game.
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Second, we derive the covered-market equilibrium of the bundling game at the
conditions of setting 2.
If we assume that the bundled system is sold not only upgraded by A1, but also alone,
the equilibrium prices are given by the solutions of the revenue-maximization problems
of the two firms, derived by substituting with the corresponding expressions for D11, D12































The optimal solution of the above problems is given by the solution of the following
system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS2Bc123M
∂ pM


















20The superscript S2Bc123 stands for setting 2 (S2), bundling (B) equilibrium, covered (c) market with
only the systems of quality ranks 1, 2, 3 (123) having positive demands.
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It is trivial that the expressions in (G41) and (G42) are always strictly positive.






The right-hand side of (G44), however, is strictly larger than the condition from above on
θ in (16) for any d21/22 > d11/12 which is ensured by (17). Hence, when the latter holds
true, pS2Bc123A2 is positive.
After substituting for the optimal prices from (G41) – (G43) in the covered-market














DS2Bc12322 = 0 (G48)
It is trivial that on the one hand, the demand expression for system A1B1 in (G45) is always
strictly positive. On the other hand, the demand expressions for the other two systems,
A1B2 and A2B1, are identical and their positivity is ensured by the condition in (17) in
the same way as the positivity of pS2Bc123A2 . Hence, the initial assumption that the bundle
system is sold not only upgraded by A1, but also alone, holds at equilibrium.
Next, if we substitute for the optimal prices from (G41) – (G43) in the expression












which is smaller than θ , i.e. the assumption for a covered market will hold at equilibrium,















The right-hand side of the inequality in (G50), however, is strictly smaller than the
condition from below on θ in (16). Hence, there is a bundling subgame equilibrium
with all three firms entering the market, firm M choosing to sell its goods in a bundle,
and all three firms having positive market shares and profits at the corresponding set of
optimal prices in (G41) – (G43). The very profits could be derived by substituting for
the optimal prices in the revenue expressions (G25) – (G27), respectively. The resulting









Similarly, we could derive the expression for the optimal revenue of firm M at the

















The difference between the firm M’s optimal revenue expressions in (G51) and (G52) is
given by the expression:


















It is trivial that W is always strictly positive while the condition for the positivity of Q is
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which is obviously larger than the condition from above on θ in (16). Hence, when the
latter holds, firm M will be strictly better off from bundling.
To summarize, when the conditions in (16) and (17) hold true, there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium characterized by all three firms entering the market, firm M
offering its goods in a bundle only and the optimal prices given in (G41) – (G43), which
completes the proof of proposition 4.
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H. Solution for Setting 3 - Proof of Propositions 5, 6 and 7
In this section, we derive the solution of the game for setting 3.
We start with analysis of the (reduced) non-bundling game equilibrium and the proof
of proposition 5.
First, note that since in setting 3 we have the same three firms as in setting 2, the
profit-maximization problems are given by (G1) – (G3) for the non-bundling game when
firms expect all the four systems to have positive demands but market not to be covered.
Accordingly, the inequality relationship between the marginal taste variables in (G7) must
hold again at equilibrium. However, the left-hand side of the inequality condition in (18)
implies that in setting 3, θ is less than twice smaller than θ . Hence, the following
inequality holds true:
θ > θ12/21 > θ22/0 (H1)
which implies non-existence of a non-covered market equilibrium with all four systems
having positive demands. Similarly, it could be shown that the inequality condition in (18)
is sufficient for the non-existence of non-covered market equilibrium with any number of
systems.
We could also show how the solution for the covered-market equilibrium derived
from (G11) implies that the inequality in (H1) must also hold when the market is expected
to be covered. Therefore, in setting 3 a covered-market equilibrium at which all the
four systems have positive demands does not exist. Furthermore, among all the other
potential covered-market equilibria at which firm M enters as a multi-product firm in both
sub-markets without bundling (S3NoBc12, S3NoBc14, S3NoBc123, S3NoBc123), that
which allows for the biggest differentiation of the systems’ qualities and therefore yields
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the highest profit for firm M is established in proposition 5 (S3NoBc14). For the sake of
brevity, it is the only equilibrium we derive below.
Let us suppose that the covered-market equilibrium established in proposition 5
exists. Namely, all firms enter, but only A1B1 and A2B2 have positive demands, and
the market is covered. Then, the equilibrium prices are given by the solutions of
the revenue-maximization problems of the three firms, derived by substituting with the
corresponding expressions for D11 and D22 from (6) and (9) as well as with D12=D21 = 0
































21The superscript S3NoBc14 stands for setting 3 (S3), non-bundling (NoB) equilibrium, covered (c)
market with only systems of quality ranks 1 and 4 (14) having positive demands.
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The optimal solution of the above problems is given by the solution of the following
system of equations (resp. first-order optimality conditions):
∂RS3NoBc14M
∂ pA1





















Note that the first two equations in (H5) are inconsistent. Therefore, we should have
a corner solution for the price of B2, i.e. it obtains the highest value at which the market

































d11/22. The validity of the latter inequality is ensured
by (19).
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The set of optimal prices (H6)–(H9) implies that A1B2 is cheaper than A2B1 as long as
















Since A1B2 is of higher rank that A2B1, however, the latter cannot have a positive market
share when charged a higher price.
Then, it remains only to show that A1B2 has no demand at the prices (H6)–(H9), when

























The inequality in (H13) is less strict than the left-hand side inequality condition in (18)
as long as d12/22 <
103
237d11/22 which is ensured by (19).
Hence, only the most differentiated systems A1B1 and A2B2 have positive market share









This result completes the proof of proposition 5.
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The proof of proposition 6 follows directly from the observation that the left-hand side
of the inequality condition in (18) is inconsistent with the condition for a positive price














pS3Bc14A2 = 0 (H18)
When the condition in (G44) is not satisfied, however, both expressions for the market









Hence, at the conditions in (18) and (19) a bundling subgame equilibrium does not
exist at which A2B1 has positive market share. Therefore, firm 2 has no incentive to
enter the market which leads to the subgame equilibrium outcome at setting 1 under the
conditions of setting 3.
To derive the optimal bundling strategy we compare the profits of firm M in case of
exclusionary bundling and in case of non-bundling. The optimal expressions for profits








RS3NoBc14∗M = (θ −θ)θd22/0−
(


















which is strictly positive when the following condition holds:
d22/0 >−
(







The right-hand side of (H24) is strictly decreasing in θ when the condition of setting 3











The inequality in (H25) is derived by substituting θ in (H24) by its lower bound in (18).








d11/22 which is ensured
by (19). Therefore, firm M finds it optimal to apply bundling and efficiently deter the
entry of firm A in the primary market. This completes the proof of proposition 6.
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Finally, to prove proposition 7, we measure the change in the social welfare, the
producer surplus and the consumer surplus in case of bundling relative to the case of
no bundling at setting 3 of the model.
The social welfare in the two subgames is given as a sum of the integrals of the




























































The difference between (H28) and (H29) gives a measure of the change in social
welfare from applying bundling at setting 3:























16(2θ +3θ)d22/0 +(14θ +3θ)d11/22
)
(H30)
The expression in (H30) is strictly negative for any θ that satisfies the condition of
setting 3 in (18).
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Producer surplus in each subgame equilibrium is given by the sum of the corresponding
profits made by the firms in the two sub-markets:















































The difference between the expressions in (H31) and (H32) gives a measure of the change





16(3θ −θ)d22/0 +(2θ +3θ)d11/22
)
(H33)
which is strictly negative when θ satisfies the condition of setting 3 in (18).
Finally, subtracting the right-hand side of (H33) from the right-hand side





16(4θ −3θ)d22/0 +(10θ −3θ)d11/22
)
(H34)
The expression in (H34) is strictly negative for any θ which satisfies the condition of
setting 3 in (18).
The expressions in (H30), (H33) and (H34) imply that bundling at setting 3 leads to
reduction in both producer and consumer surpluses and thus has strictly negative social
welfare effect. This result completes the proof of proposition 7.
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